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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fraud happens;1 and the challenge for the drafters of commer-
cial and bank collectiOns law Is to provide a means to allocate 
1. See Sle1cher v. Sle1cher, 251 N.Y. 366, 371, 167 N.E. 501, 503 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J., 
writing for the maJority, stated that "[t)he phases of fraud are manifold."). Another pronu-
nent Amencan JUrist has also noted that: 
"As to relief agamst frauds, no mvanable rules can be established. Fraud IS mfinite; 
and were a court of equity once to lay down rules, how far they would go, and no 
farther, m extending the1r relief agamst it, or to define stnctly the spec1es or ev1dence 
of 1t, the JUrisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes, 
wh1ch the fertility of man's mvention would contnve." 
1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, As ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA § 186, at 198 n.5 (lith ed. 1873) (quoting letter from Lord Hardw1cke to Lord 
Kames (June 30, 1759)). 
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fraud losses In a manner that Is both economically rational and 
responsive to conceptiOns of Immanent JUStice. 2 The contours of 
that allocatiOn, when finally formulated, will likely be affected by 
political consideratiOns. 3 In payments law, the Interests of financial 
InstitutiOns are JUXtaposed against those of their customers,4 often 
consumers. 6 
This Article examines the accommodation of these often com-
peting Interests that has shaped the commercial paper and bank 
collectiOns treatment of bank liability that accrues when a fiduci-
ary with the power to sign and Indorse checks fraudulently diverts 
such check proceeds to unauthorized uses. This IS not an area of 
payments law that has been subJect to exhaustive treatment In the 
commentaries. 6 In this Arttcle, we will trace the development of 
fiduciary fraud principles as promulgated In Article 3 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code7 ("U.C.C.") and 1n the Uniform Fiduciaries 
Act8 ("U.F.A."). We will then examine the fiduciary fraud rules of 
revised ArtiCle 3 of the U.C.C.,9 promulgated In 1990 by the Ameri-
\ 
2. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 431-37 (1960) 
(citing Ch1ef Justice Cardozo's opm10n m MacPherson v. BUlck Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 
111 N.E. I050 (1916)). 
3. Cf. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commerctal Code Should Not Be Adopted, 
61 YALE L.J. 334, 357-63 (1952); Gilmore, The Uniform Commerctal Code: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 374-78 (1952) (discussmg the political forces at work durmg 
the drafting of U.C.C. Article 4). 
4. See U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(5) (1990) ("'Customer' means a person havmg an account 
with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and mcludes a bank mamtammg 
an account at another bank "). 
5. Cf. Electromc Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(5) (1988) (defines "consumer" 
as a natural person). 
6. The Issues treated here are to be distinguished from the 1ssues presented when a 
bank customer attempts to Impose fiduc1ary liability on her bank. For a recent treatment of 
that setting, see Note, The Fiducwry Controversy: InJection of Fiducwry Prmclples mto 
the Bank-Depositor and Bank-Borrower Relationshtps, 20 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 795 (1987). 
7. U.C.C. art. 3 (1989) (ongmally promulgated JOintly by The Amencan Law Institute 
and The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws .m 1951). 
8. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES ACT (U.L.A.) (1985) (ongmally promulgated and approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Amencan Bar Asso-
ctation m 1922). 
9. U.C.C. art. 3 (1990). 
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can Law Instltute10 ("ALI") and the National Conference of 
Commisswners on Uniform State Laws11 ("NCCUSL"). 
Part II of this Article Introduces various fiduciary fraud 
problems and the transactiOnal contexts m which they arise. We 
also offer our general observations about the concepts of duty and 
breach of duty that most often attend resolutwn of "troublesome 
cases."12 Part III of this Article reviews the provisions of the 
U.F.A. and former U.C.C. ArtiCle 3, as well as the relevant case 
law, concermng fiduciary fraud. That review will demonstrate that 
courts have not uniformly adhered to statutory policy, but rather 
have sometimes Imposed greater liability on banks dealing with a 
fiduciary than appears to have been mtended by the drafters. We 
then consider the fiduciary fraud provisions of revised Article 3 
and note that some provisions of revised ArtiCle 3 change previous 
law by shiftmg the risk of employee fraud from third parties who 
deal with employees to the employer.13 In contrast, other provi-
swns of revised Article 3 Impose greater liability than did prior law 
on third parties who deal With fiduciaries, Including employees.14 
Therefore, the new provisions may be contradictory m some m-
stances. The Article will conclude In Part IV by reviewmg these 
apparent contradictiOns and suggestmg alternative InterpretatiOns 
of the varwus U.C.C. sectwns that should produce reasonable and 
consistent results. We also suggest that it might have been more 
appropriate to abandon some of the rigid, specific statutory rules 
mcorporated Into revised sectiOn 3-30715 regarding fiduciary fraud, 
IO. The Amencan Law Institute began m 1921 as a project proposed by the Associa-
tion of Amencan Law Schools. The ALI was envtswned as a "junstic centre for the 
betterment of the law," and "its first major undertakmg should be to prepare a 'Restate-
ment of the Law. " W TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MovEMENT 273-74 
(1973). 
11. The NCCUSL was formed m 1892 and IS composed of unpa1d commiSSioners ap-
pomted by state governors. It prepares pnmarily m commerctal law acts for possible 
adoption by state legislatures. W TwiNING, supra note 10, at 272. 
I d. 
12. See W TwiNING, supra note 10, at 160: 
The "trouble case method" cons1sts of exammmg m detail the processes mvolved m 
settling actual disputes. What happened, what each participant did m relation to the 
dispute, what steps were taken by what other persons, the final outcome, the reason-
mg of the dec1ders, the effects of the dec1s1on on the parties themselves, on future 
trouble cases and on the general life of the group are to be cons1dered m depth. 
13. See mfra notes 363-82 and accompanymg text. 
14. See mfra notes 279-316 and accompanymg text. 
15. u.c.c. § 3-307 (1990). 
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leaving the matter Instead entirely to the more flexible approach 
under the "good faith" provisions of revised sectiOns 3-404, 3-405 
and 3-406.16 
II. TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXTS AND "THE RISK REASONABLY TO BE 
PERCEIVED"17 
This part of the Article describes several contexts In which a 
payment transaction Involvmg a fiduciary's handling of her benefi-
Ciary's18 negotiable Instrument presents fraud risks. The situatiOns 
generally Involve the fiduciary's transfer of a negotiable Instrument 
either to a thud party (including a bank) or to herself and a fiduci-
ary's deposit of an item In a bank for collectiOn. As the followmg 
discussiOn will demonstrate, the various permutatiOns of the basic 
payment and collectiOn scenarios present various fraud opportuni-
ties as well as a . concomitantly broad range of factual variatiOns 
that may, depending on the ImpressiOns of a trier of fact, yield 
diametncally opposed legal conclusiOns. 
The Uniform Fiduciaries Act defines a "fiduciary" as follows: 
[A] trustee under any trust, expressed, Implied, resultmg or con-
structive, executor, admmistrator, guardian, conservator, curator, 
receiver, trustee m bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, 
partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, public of-
I6. Id. §§ 3-404, 3-405 & 3-406. See also td. § 3-103(a)(4) ("'Good faith' means hon-
esty m fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fa1r dealing."). U.C.C. 
section 1-102 prov1des as follows: 
(l)Th1s Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlymg pur-
poses and polic1es. 
(2)Underlymg purposes and polic1es of th1s Act are 
(a) to s1mplify, clarify and modermze the law govermng commercial 
transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, 
usage and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the var10us JUrisdictions. 
U.C.C. § 1-102(1) & (2) (1989). See also Hawkland, Uniform Commerczal "Code" Methodol-
ogy, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 296 & 320 ·("[T]he commercial law grew along lines wh1ch 
produced gaps and uncertamties m spite of volumes of cases. Indeed, gaps and uncertamties 
seem to have been generated m direct proportion to the number of published op1mons " 
As a result, "[t]he commerc1al community has made a modest demand on the law to g1ve it 
r1ght rules wh1ch will operate evenly and with a fa1r degree of predictability."). 
17. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). 
18. In th1s Article, the term "beneficiary" 1s used to describe persons for whom a fidu-
ciary 1s acting, mcluding benefic.anes of trusts, partners, employers, or similarly situated 
prmc1pals. 
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ficer, or any other person actmg m a fiduciary capacity for any 
person, trust or estate. 19 
The revised Article 3 definitiOn IS similar; both definitions seem to 
encompass anyone acting on behalf of another.20 In the normal 
course fiduciaries often handle payment transactiOns Involving 
checks for their beneficiaries. Unfortunately, such a normal course 
of handling checks provides ample opportunity for fiduciaries to 
embezzle funds of their beneficiaries. In the next portion of this 
Article, we examine the fact patterns of fiduciary fraud with which 
this Article deals. 
A. Payments to Fiducwnes 
The rule at common law21 Imposed a duty on those who dealt 
with fiduciaries to assure that payments made to the fiduciary 
were applied In a manner consistent With the beneficiary's mter-
est.22 So, If a fiduciary applied a payment mconsistent with the 
beneficiary's Interest, the party making the payment to the fiduci-
ary would remain liable to the beneficiary 23 
Arguably, the early common law rule made sense when busi-
nesses were small, usually owned by mdividuals who handled 
business matters themselves, and most fiduciaries represented 
trusts or estates. However, such a rule long ago ceased to make 
sense In a business world dominated by large enterprises operatmg 
through fiduciaries m far-flung activities. In fact, the old common 
19. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT § l(I), 7A U.L.A. 395-96 (1985). 
20. U.C.C. § 3-307(a)(1) (1990) (" 'Fiduciary' means an agent, trustee, partner, corpo-
rate officer or director, or other representative owmg a fiduciary duty with respect to an 
mstrument."). Compare also UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 1(6), 7A U.L.A. 395-96 
(1985) with BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § I01(30) (1988) (definition of "insider"). See m-
fra notes 329-34. However, the precise reach of the definitions are unclear and It may be 
more appropnate, m the context of revised Article 3, to read the definition restnctively so as 
not, for example, to mclude a constructive trustee. 
21. See New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. National Newark & Essex Bankmg Co., I17 
N.J. Eq. 264, I75 A. 609 (N.J. Ch. I934), aff'd, 119 N.J. Eq. 540, I82 A. 824 (1936); Colby v. 
Riggs Nat'l Bank, 92 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Research-Plannmg, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 
690 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1984). But see Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th 
Cir. 1959) (disagreemg with Colby, 92 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1937)), cert. demed, 362 U.S. 962 
(1960). 
22. See National Casualty Co. v. Caswell & Co., 317 Ill. App. 66, 69, 45 N.E.2d 698, 
699-700 (1942). 
23. Note that the question of the fiduciary's authority IS a separate Issue. See UNIF. 
FIDUCIARIES AcT§ 2 comment, 7A U.L.A. 401 (1985). 
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law rule largely became a dead letter even In ordinary trust cases 
since the usual trust document specifically provided that a person 
dealing with the trustee had no obligatiOn to ensure that money 
paid was properly applied by the trustee. 24 
The old common law rule was severely criticized, 25 and was 
reJected by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.26 The U.F.A. provides 
that a third party making payment to a fiduciary has not obligated 
itself to ensure the proper applicatiOn of such funds, and has no 
liability absent bad faith.27 Similarly, comment 5 to former U.C.C. 
sectiOn 3-30428 states that the purchaser of an Instrument may pay 
cash to a fiduciary without becoming liable, unless the purchaser 
has notice of a breach of fiduciary duty 29 Of course, under certain 
circumstances, a payment to a fiduciary by cash or check Is so 
likely to lead to fraudulent misapplicatiOn, or the circumstances 
are so unusual, that a court will Infer bad faith negligence and hold 
the payor liable for the resulting breach of trust. 30 
B. Fiducwry's Transfer of Negotwble Instruments 
If a fiduciary Is authorized to draw or Indorse a negotiable In-
strument, and therefore Is not guilty of forgery, transferees of the 
Instrument can become holders In due course. 31 Holders In due 
course take free of defenses and claims of pnor parties, Including 
24. See 4 A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, THE LAw OF TRUSTS§ 32I (4th ed. 1989). 
25. See, e.g., Scott, Particzpation m a Breach of Trust, 34 HARV. L. REv. 454, 480-82 
(1921). 
26. See UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 2, 7A U.L.A. 401 (1985); see also m{ra notes 60-64 
and accompanymg text. 
27. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 2, 7A U.L.A. 401 (1985). See also mfra notes 60-64 and 
accompanymg text. 
28. U.C.C. § 3-304 comment 5 (1989). 
29. Comment 5 of former section 3-304 stated as follows: 
Subsection (2) follows the policy of Section 6 of the Uniform Fiductanes Act, and 
specifies the same elements as notice of Improper conduct of a fiduciary. Under para-
graph (e) of subsection (4) mere notice of the existence of the fiduciary relation IS not 
enough m itself to prevent the holder from takmg m due course, and he ts free to take 
the mstrument on the assumption that the fiduciary 1s acting properly. The purchaser 
may pay cash mto the hands of the fiduciary without notice of any breach of the 
obligation. Section 3-206 should be consulted for the effect of a restnctive 
mdorsement. 
/d. § 3-304 comment 5. 
30. See mfra notes 218-35 and accompanymg text. 
31. u.c.c. § 3-302 (1989). 
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claims that a fiduciary has embezzled the mstrument or Its pro-
ceeds. 32 The question then arises whether the usual holder m due 
course rules should be modified: should a taker from a fiduciary be 
held responsible for loss ansing from fiduciary fraud even though 
the taker would otherwise be a holder In due course? We will see 
that courts have differed as to the appropnate balance of Interests. 
Moreover, the revised Article 3 definitiOn of "good fa1th"33 and the 
addition of revised section 3-30734 have substantially changed the 
statutory rules applicable to banks that take checks from 
fiducianes. 
There are a number of different fact patterns that mvolve a 
greater likelihood of fiduciary wrongdOing than others. It IS appro-
pnate to draw distinctions along lines that suggest relative degrees 
of nsk. Useful distinct10ns Include: (a) to whom 1s the Instrument 
payable: (i) the fiduciary as such, (ii) the fiduciary personally, or 
(iii) a thud party; (b) who IS the drawer: (i) the fiduciary, (ii) the 
beneficiary, or (iii) a thud party; and (c) what knowledge, actual or 
mferred, does a thud party who deals with the check have regard-
mg possible fiduciary wrongdomg with respect to the mstrument. 36 
Moreover, these cons1derat10ns may ultimately be posited m terms 
of negligence: would the circumstances surrounding the negotiation 
of the mstrument be sufficient to cause a reasonable person to m-
qmre mto the fiduciary's authonty to effect the transfer?36 
As a corollary to such "suspicious cucumstances," a maJor 
quest10n probative of whether the fiduciary's transfer of the check 
was fraudulent Is whether the mstrument was transferred by the 
fiduciary In satisfact10n of an obligat10n of the fiduciary, or an obli-
gation of the beneficiary Of course, this IS a matter that would 
32. I d. § 3-305. 
33. U.C.C. § 3-I03(a)(4) {I990) ("Good faith" IS defined as "honesty m fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."). See also td. § 3-I03 com-
ment 4 {"Although fair dealing IS a broad term that cannot be defined with any precision, it 
IS clear that it Is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the care with which an 
act IS performed."). 
34. Rev1sed U.C.C. section 3-307{b) provides rules applicable where a "taker [for 
value] has knowledge of the fiduc1ary status of the fiduciary, and a breach of fiduciary 
duty [has resulted]." Id. § 3-307(b). 
35. See generally W KEETON, D. DoBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 35 (5th ed. I984). 
36. See Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. 329 (1978); Joffe v. United Cal. Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 541, 190 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1983). 
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generally require vutually no extrinsic InvestigatiOn by thud party 
transferees. 37 
1. Instruments Payable to Th~rd Partles.-The first cate-
gory of cases that we examine Involves the fiduciary's transfer of 
its beneficiary's negotiable Instrument to a thud party to whom 
the Instrument IS payable, either In satisfaction of an antecedent 
debt or In exchange for new value. In such circumstances, two ob-
vious questiOns arise: (1) If the taker of the Instrument knows that 
the transferor Is a fiduciary and also knows that the Instrument Is 
being transferred for the fiduciary's personal benefit, sliould the 
taker bear the risk that the fiduciary has made an unauthorized 
transfer for the fiduciary's personal benefit; and (2) should the 
taker be liable to the beneficiary for any fiduciary wrongdomg re-
garding the unauthorized transfer if the taker did not actually 
know but should have reasonably known that the transactiOn did 
not benefit the beneficiary? We will discover that both the U.F.A. 
and revised U.C.C. Article 3 answer the first question, "yes," and 
the second questiOn, "maybe." However, under revised Article 3, 
the taker IS more likely to be held liable for what she should rea-
sonably have known. 38 
2. Instruments Payable to "Fiducwry as Such."-An Instru-
ment payable to "John Doe, trustee, for the benefit of Mary Jones" 
Is clearly Intended to benefit Mary Jones rather than John Doe. 
The design of the maker or drawer was to transfer value to Mary 
by usmg John as a conduit. The Instrument, then, Is payable to 
John Doe, as Mary's fiduciary, since it Is payable to the "fiduciary 
as such. "39 
Instruments must sometimes be made so payable. Corpora-
tiOns must act through agents; similarly, trusts and estates must 
also act through a trustee or an executor, administrator or personal 
representative. Even where there IS an mdividual beneficiary who 
could act for herself, a fiduciary may frequently be authorized to 
act for her. Therefore, fiduciaries must be able to engage In trans-
actiOns Involving negotiable Instruments payable to the "fiduciary 
37. See also mfra text accompanying notes 48-52. 
38. As to the U.F.A .• see mfra text accompanymg notes 54-85. As to the result under 
rev1sed Article 3, see mfra text accompanying notes 267-362. 
39. It will often be the case that the item IS not clearly made payable to the fiduciary 
"as such!' A threshold 1ssue may be whether the check was m fact made payable to the 
fiduc1ary m the fiduciary•s mdividual capacity, rather than its fiduciary capacity. 
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as such" m a manner Similar to that of a beneficiary herself. Nev-
ertheless, liability may be appropnately Imposed on a financial 
mstitutwn that takes an Instrument from a fiduciary, when the 
bank thereafter gives the fiduciary value under Circumstances that 
would reasonably suggest that such a remittance compromises the 
nghts of the beneficiary 
Of course, any rule that IS promulgated to formulate the con-
tours of a bank's exposure to liability under these circumstances 
should take mto account the mstrument Itself, as well as the cu 
cumstances surrounding the bank's receipt of the Item. Again, as m 
the case of an Instrument payable to a thud party, so far as the 
fraud calculus IS concerned, when a bank takes an Instrument pay-
able to the "fiduciary as such," liability may hinge upon who drew 
the 1tem, and under what cucumstances the Item was drawn. 
If the beneficiary has drawn the Item, there may be less reason 
for the bank to be suspicious of the fiduciary's transfer of the item 
than would be the case were the Item drawn by the fiduciary That 
conclusiOn naturally flows from the long-standing principles of 
commercial paper law concermng authorized and unauthorized sig-
natures. 40 But JUSt because an Item has been drawn by the 
fiduciary, rather than the beneficiary, does not compel the conclu-
SIOn that the check has been drawn to accomplish a fraud on the 
beneficiary In many situatiOns, no one but a fiduciary IS available 
to draw a check. Even when the prmcipal can act for herself, she 
will frequently find It more convenient, If not a business necessity, 
to allow mstruments to be drawn and signed by her fiduciary Ulti-
mately, the question will be whether, given the vanous 
40. See, e.g., McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 896 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1990) ("faith-
less employee" defense did not absolve collecting bank of liability where bank failed to 
follow "sound stated polic1es" agamst cashmg thnd-party checks); Lund v. Chemical Bank, 
665 F Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y. I987) (party held stnctly liable to bank pursuant to former 
section 3-417(1}(b) for breach of warranty that all Signatures are genume and authonzed 
when checks presented with forged mdorsements), rev d sub nom., Lunds, Inc. v. Chem1cal 
Bank, 870 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. I989) (although a matenal question of fact precluded granting 
bank's summary Judgment motion below, bank could assert contributory negligence as de-
fense to conversiOn and payee nevertheless had a nght to brmg conversiOn action agamst 
bank despite fact that check was never actually delivered to such mdorsee); Federal Deposit 
Ins. Corp. v. Galloway, 856 F.2d 112 (lOth Cir. 1988) (company held liable pursuant to for-
mer section 3-401 as maker of a note that its pres1dent had s1gned as authonzed); Guaranty 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 454 F Supp. 488 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (depositary 
and collecting banks held liable pursuant to former section 4-207 for breach of presentment 
warranty). 
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opportunities for fiduciary fraud, commercial paper law should Im-
pose the risk of fiduciary misconduct on the beneficiary or upon 
the bank that deals with the unfaithful fiduciary QuestiOns of bus-
Iness expedience, and even necessity, are crucial to the calculus by 
whiCh such risk of loss will be allocated. 
C. Deposz.ts by Fiducwry 
An Issue that frequently arises IS allocatiOn of loss m cases of a 
fiduciary's misappropriatiOn of check proceeds deposited In a fi-
nancial InstitutiOn. Again, the way In which the check Is drawn, as 
well as the manner In which the fiduciary deposits the check, will 
have a bearing upon the allocatiOn of the risk of loss occasiOned by 
fiduciary fraud. The followmg subsectiOns focus on three ways m 
which items may be deposited by fiduciaries41 and demonstrate 
how distinct factual contexts may affect the fraud analysis. 
1. Deposz.t to Account of uFiducwry as Such."-In order to 
accommodate the more expeditious execution of the affrurs of its 
beneficiary, a fiduciary may open a bank account, with the blessing 
and often at the directiOn of Its beneficiary, Into which Items, pay-
able to the fiduciary for the benefit of the beneficiary, may be 
deposited for collectiOn. The fiduciary will likely have signatory 
authority over the account, and will therefore be able to make dis-
bursements from the account In a manner consistent with the 
Interests of its beneficiary To facilitate operatiOn of the account, it 
will likely be opened In the name of the "fiduciary as such" (that 
Is, by actually Identifying the fiduciary's representative capacity on 
the account itself). Thereafter, items for deposit Into such an ac-
count would be made payable to· the "fiduciary as such. "42 
The factual variables treated In this portion of the Article are 
necessarily Interrelated with consideratiOns surrounding the form 
In which the check IS drawn, the subJect of the preceding sectiOn. 43 
Particularly, the designatiOn of the payee will be a substantial fac-
tor In determinmg the liability exposure of a depositary bank. 44 If 
4'1. A "depositary bank" ts "the first bank to whtch an item ts transferred for collec-
tion even though it IS also the payor bank." U.C.C. § 4-105(a) (1989). 
42. Cf. ld. § 3-403 comment 3 (providing illustrations of proper agency Signatures). 
43. See supra text accompanymg notes 38-40. 
44. U.C.C. § 3-206(3) (1989) ("must pay or apply any value of the mstrument 
conststently with the mdorsement and to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder fox: 
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the Item IS made payable to the "fiduciary as such" and deposited 
m an account with the same designatiOn, It would be difficult to 
fault the depositary for havmg accepted the Item for deposit to 
that account; mdeed, It IS not clear that the beneficiary should be 
heard to complam of such an action by the depositary 45 Of course, 
the beneficiary may have good reason to complam about the ulti-
mate disposition of the funds by the depositary once they are 
collected. Nevertheless, for present purposes, the depositary's ac 
ceptance of the Item for deposit mto a properly designated 
fiduciary account must be distingUished from a subsequent dispo-
sitiOn of the proceeds from the account. The proper acceptance 
and deposit of an Item should not alter the eqmtable balance m a 
manner mimical to the Interest of the depositary bank. 
2. DeposLt to Account of Beneficwry -If the depositary ac 
cepts the Item payable to either the beneficiary or the "fiduciary as 
such," and credits the proceeds of the deposit to an account of the 
beneficiary, the analysis should proceed much as It would m the 
case described m the preceding sectlon.46 There Is no reason for 
the depositary to Infer that anythmg unsavory would likely result 
from creditmg an account of the beneficiary with the amount of 
the Item. Under ordinary circumstances, the mere deposit could 
not, without more, preJudice the beneficiary 47 Arguably, when de-
posits are made to the beneficiary's account, the law should be 
reluctant to Infer negligence and, therefore, not be qmck to Impose 
value"); td. § 3-205(d) (" An mdorsement IS restrictive whtch states that it ts for the 
benefit or use of the mdorser or of another person."). But see td. §§ 3-206(2) & 4-205(2) 
(Both provtswns provtde that "[a]n mtermediary bank, or a payor bank whtch ts not the 
depositary bank, ts neither gtven nottce nor otherwise affected by a restnctive mdorsement 
of any person except the bank's Immediate transferor."). 
45. ld. §§ 3-206(3) & 3-205(d). See also Ld. § 3-207(2) (holder m due course vested 
wtth enforcement nghts (former section 3-301) even m circumstances of a negotiation result-
mg from a breach of duty-such enforcement nghts will therefore overcome "the 
declaration of a constructive trust or any other remedy permitted by law"). 
46. See supra text accompanymg notes 42-45. 
47. However, prejudice may flow m extraordinary circumstances. That IS, if there were 
a deposit mto an account over wh1ch a fiduciary, or another th1rd party, had signatory au-
thority, InJUry to the beneficiary's mterest would be more likely to occur than if the Item 
had been deposited mto an account over whtch stgnatory authority was more restncted. Of 
course, the depositary would likely not be able to antictpate such preJudice, absent notice of 
the fiduciary s disloyalty at the time of deposit. More Importantly, the tmpositton of liability 
upon a depositary based merely upon a beneficiary's or fiduciary's chotce of account would 
certamly mvolve a stramed policy constderation. 
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liability upon a depositary for fiduciary fraud regardless of how the 
item had been drawn. 
3. Deposr,t to Personal Account of Fiducwry -But what if 
the fiduciary takes an item payable to the beneficiary, or to the 
"fiduciary as such," and then deposits the item Into the fiduciary's 
own personal account? Then the depositary might be applying the 
item Inconsistently with the Interests of the beneficiary 48 But cer-
tainly, that conclusiOn would not Irrefutably flow simply from the 
fact of deposit In the fiduciary's personal account. Conceivably, the 
fiduciary may ultimately use the funds represented by the deposit 
to discharge an obligation of her beneficiary 49 
It would seem, however, that the depositary's act of crediting 
the personal account of the fiduciary with funds belongmg to the 
beneficiary would more readily accommodate the fiduciary's possi-
ble embezzlement of the funds. 50 Moreover, commingling 
complicates tracmg and likely subJects trust funds to the reach of 
personal creditors of the fiduciary 51 Perhaps a greater responsibil-
Ity should be appropriately Imposed upon a depositary when a 
fraudulent diversion of funds IS facilitated by the depositary's 
crediting of the beneficiary's funds to a fiduciary's personal 
account. 52 
48. U.C.C. §§ 3-206(3) & 3-205(d) (1989) (item applied mcons1stently with restnctive 
mdorsement would preclude holder m due course status). 
49. Of course, there are common law and ethical prohibitions agamst a fiduciary's 
commmgling of funds. p HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 263 (rev. 
ed. 1987) ("It IS a breach of trust for the trustee to deposit trust funds m a bank account m 
h1s mdiv1dual name which contams h1s mdiv1dual funds as well."). However, "[t]he prohibi-
tion agamst commmgling has been partially abrogated m almost all JUrisdictions to permit a 
corporate fiduciary to hold and mvest trust assets m a common trust fund." J. DuKEMINIER 
& S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 873 (4th ed. 1990) (citing 3 A. SCOTT & W. 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 227.9 (4th ed. 1989)) (prohibits commmgling of client 
property with attorney's own property). See M. PIRSJG & K. KIRWIN, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 481 (4th ed. 1984) ("It IS not a defense that commmgling 
of a client's funds was due to careless office supervision or madequate bookkeepmg. Evi-
dence of dishonest motives IS unnecessary for disctpline." (footnotes omitted)); Adams, 
George, Lee, Schulte & Ward, P.A. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 597 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(attorneys liable for retammg lien agamst client's portion of a $300,000 JUqgment). 
50. P HASKELL, supra note 49, at 263. 
51. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 49, at 873. 
52. See supra text accompanymg notes 48-52. 
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III. STATUTORY TREATMENT oF BANK's LIABILITY FOR FmuciARY 
FRAUD 
This part of the Article builds upon the foregomg survey of 
the recurrmg opportunities for fiduciary fraud. The first sectiOn 
describes both statutory and common law responses to the Issues 
presented when a beneficiary tnes to Impose liability upon a bank 
for a fiduciary's malfeasance. Throughout this discussiOn, a major 
policy questiOn IS whether there should be relatively ngid rules 
that produce greater certamty, or whether courts should be per· 
mitted substantial flexibility to reach "fau results" on a case by 
case basis. 53 
A. Untform Fiducwnes Act 
The Umform Fiduciaries Act, promulgated by the NCCUSL In 
1922,54 and adopted by twenty.four states and the Distnct of Co· 
lumbia, 55 protects certain thud parties dealing with unfaithful 
fiductaries.56 The Act broadly defines "fiduciary" to mclude, among 
others, trustees, personal representatives, agents, partners, officers 
of corporatiOns, and "any other person acting m a fiduciary capac· 
1ty for any person, trust or estate."57 
The Act 1s comprised of mne substantive sectwns. Of those 
sectwns, sectiOn 3 deals With registration and transfer of secuntles 
53. For a debate concernmg the tens1on that attends such prov1s1ons of flexibility, see 
Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscwnability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 767 (1969) and Leff, Uncon-
scwnability and the Code-The Emperors New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967). 
54. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT h1stoncal note, 7A U.L.A. 391 (I985). 
55. See UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT preface, 7A U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 1990) (adopting JUnsdic 
tions are Alabama, Anzona, Colorado, Distnct of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinms, Indiana, 
Loms1ana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missoun, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohw, Pennsylvama, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virgm Islands, Wiscon-
sm, and Wyommg). 
56. C{. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 391-92 (1985) ("The liabilities 
of the fiduc1ary h1mself are not dealt with, but only the liabilities of the person dealing with 
the fiduc1ary. The general purpose of the Act 1s to establish uniform and definite rules as 
to 'constructive notice' of breaches of fiduc1ary obligations."). 
!d. 
57. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT§ 1(1), 7A U.L.A. 395-96 (1985). The complete definition 1s: 
"Fiduc1ary" mcludes a trustee under any trust, expressed, 1mplied, resultmg or 
constructive, executor, admm1strator, guardian, conservator, curator, rece1ver, trustee 
m bankruptcy, ass1gnee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corpo-
ration, public or pnvate, public officer, or any other person acting m a fiduc1ary 
capacity for any person, trust or estate. 
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held by a fiduc1ary/8 and sectiOn 10 deals with deposits m the 
names of two or more fiduc1ar1es. 59 Because these two sectiOns are 
not directly pertinent to the 1nquuy of th1s Art1cle, they will not be 
considered further. The other sectiOns, however, are relevant to 
our subJect, and are therefore discussed br1efly below. 
1. Sectwn 2: "Applicatwn of Payments Made to Fiduc~a­
nes."-SectiOn 2 of the Act proVIdes that one who 1n good faith 
transfers or pays money or property to a fiduciary 1s not responsi-
ble for the proper applicatiOn by the fiduciary of the money or 
property, prov1ded that the fiduciary IS authorized to rece1ve it.60 
Protected by th1s proVIsion, a bank may dispense funds to a ·fiduci-
ary from a fiduciary account,61 or cash a check payable to the 
pnnc1pal or the "fiduciary as such,"62 without becoming liable for 
fiduciary misappropriatiOn of the cash, provided the bank made 
the payment In good faith63 and the fiduciary had the requisite sig-
natory authority 64 
2. Sectwn 4: "Transfer of Negotzable Instrument by Fiduc~­
ary "-SectiOn 4 of the U.F.A. provides that if a fiduciary, with 
power to do so, Indorses a negotiable Instrument payable or In-
dorsed to him or to his beneficiary, the Indorsee has no duty to 
Inquire whether the fiduciary Is committing a breach of trust. The 
58. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 3, 7 A U.L.A. 404 (1985). 
59. See UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 10, 7A U.L.A. 423 (1985). Section 10 provtdes that m 
cases of deposit m the names of two or more trustees and with authorization of multiple 
trustees to draw checks on the trust account, neither a payee, nor other holder, nor the bank 
IS requued to mvestigate whether such authorization IS a breach of trust. 
I d. 
60. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 2, 7A U.L.A. 401 (1985). Section 2 prov1des as follows: 
A person who m good faith pays or transfers to a fiduc1ary any money or other prop-
erty whtch the fiduciary as such IS authorized to rece1ve, IS not responsible for the 
proper application thereof by the fiductary; and any right or title acqutred from the 
fiductary m consideration of such payment or transfer IS not mvalid m consequence of 
a misapplication by the fiductary. 
61. Board of County Comm'rs v. First Nat'l Bank, 368 P.2d 132, 138 (Wyo. 1962). 
62. See National Casualty Co. v. Caswell & Co., 317 Ill. App. 66, 68, 45 N.E.2d 698, 
699 (1942); Clibon Drilling Co. v. Wyommg Mineral Corp., 42 Colo. App. 41, 43, 589 P.2d 78, 
80 (1978); Robmson Protective Alarm Co. v. Bolger & Picker, 512 Pa. 116, 124, 516 A.2d 
299, 303-04 (1986). 
63. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 396 (1985) ("Good faith" IS a thmg "in 
fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently or not."); see also ALA. CoDE § 35-4-254 
(1975) (payor of payment made to a trustee IS not liable for the misapplication of payment 
"unless it be made to appear that the person makmg such payment colluded with the trus-
tee, or knew of [the trustee's] mtention to waste or mismanage the funds."). 
64. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 2, 7A U.L.A. 401 (1985). 
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Indorsee IS not charged with notice that a breach of trust Is bemg 
committed, unless the Indorsee actually knows of the breach, has 
knowledge of such facts that taking the mstrument Is evidence of 
bad faith, or knows that the transactiOn Is for the personal benefit 
of the fiduciary 6~ Section 4, therefore, protects a transferee from a 
clatm by the beneficiary that the transferee participated m a 
wrongful transfer of a negotiable mstrument, so long as the trans-
feree neither acted In bad faith nor knew that the transaction was 
for the benefit of the fiduciary 66 Although the Act does not define 
"bad faith," the term has been construed to mean dishonesty, not 
mere negligence or failure to act reasonably 67 
3. Sectwn 5: "Check Drawn by Fiducwry Payable to Thtrd 
Person. "-Section 5 of the Act protects payees of checks or other 
drafts drawn by a "fiduciary as such," or drawn m the name of the 
beneficiary 68 That sectiOn applies to payees the same rules applied 
by sectiOn 4 to Indorsees. 69 
4. Sectwn 6. "Check Drawn by and Payable to Fiduct-
ary "-Pursuant to sectiOn 6 of the Act, transferees of checks 
drawn by the "fiduciary as such" and payable to the fiduciary per-
sonally or checks drawn by the fiduciary as such and payable to 
thud persons who have mdorsed the Item back to the fiduciary, 
can take such checks without liability even m transactiOns known 
to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, so long as the trans-
65. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 405 (I985). 
66. Compare Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. First State Bank, 390 S.W.2d 9I3 (Mo. 
App. 1965) (court held that bank had actual knowledge of fiduciary breach and as a result 
was liable to beneficiary) with Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Lafayette Nat'l Bank, 35 A.D.2d 
137, 314 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1970) (court held that bank did not have knowledge of fiduciary's 
m1sappropnation), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 638, 282 N.E.2d 621, 331 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1972). 
67. See, eg., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Bank of Charlotte, 340 F.2d 550, 554 (4th Cir. 
1965) (bad faith means "dishonesty [but] [t]h1s abbreviated definition 1s maccurate if it 1s 
read to emphas1ze and reqmre a h1gh degree of moral guilt. Neither cnmmal fraud nor 
downnght corruption 1s an essential mgredient of legal 'bad faith' At some pomt, obvi-
ous cncumstances become so cogent that it 1s 'bad faith' to remam passiVe." (citations 
omitted)); Davis v. Pennsylvama Co. for Ins. on L1ves & Granting Annuities, 337 Pa. 456, 
459, 12 A.2d 66, 68 (1940) (bad faith means "only when [the act] 1s done dishonestly and not 
merely negligently"); Guild v. First Nat'l Bank, 92 Nev. 478, 483, 553 P.2d 955, 958 (1976) 
(Mere "lack of due care, or negligence," does not establish bad faith. "In the absence of 
consciOus purposeful misconduct, banks may not be held liable."). See also mfra note 83. 
68. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT§ 5, 7A U.L.A. 406-07 (1985) (payee not liable to beneficiary 
for resulting fiduciary fraud if payee has no knowledge of any misappropriatiOn or has not 
acted m bad faith). 
69. Id. § 5. 
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feree had neither actual knowledge of the breach of trust nor acted 
In bad faith. 70 The underlying assumption of the sectiOn Is that 
fiduCiaries will often be entitled to receive payment from the fidu-
ciary account as payment for services rendered or reimbursement 
for expenditures made on behalf of the beneficiary 71 In such cases, 
it would be very cumbersome if the checks had to be signed by 
someone other than the fiduciary 
5. Sectwn 7· uDeposz,t z,n Name of 'Fiducwry as 
Such.' "-Sections 7 through 9 of the U.F.A. cover depositones 
that deal with fiduCiaries. SectiOn 7 provides that if a bank deposit 
IS made to the credit of a "fiduciary as such," the bank has no duty 
to determine whether the fiduciary has drawn checks thereon con-
sistently with the beneficiary's Interest, and Is therefore not liable 
to the beneficiary for a breach of trust by the fiduciary, unless the 
bank has knowledge of either a breach of an obligation by the fidu-
ciary or of such facts that paytng the item amounts to bad faith by 
the bank.72 If, however, the fiduciary draws a check on the account 
payable to the bank and the bank knows that the check Is In-
tended to satisfy or IS security for a personal obligatiOn of the 
fiduciary, then the bank Is liable for any resultmg loss to the bene-
ficiary if the fiduciary has In fact breached her fiduciary 
o bliga tlon. 73 
6. Sectwn 8: "Deposz,t z,n Name of Pnncz,pal."-Sect10n 8 
protects a bank as payor to the same extent that a depositary Is 
protected under sectiOn 7, if a fiduciary IS authorized to draw 
checks on an account of the beneficiary 74 The bank may, In such a 
case, pay the check signed by the fiduciary without liability to the 
beneficiary unless the bank knows that the fiduciary Is breaching 
her trust or has knowledge of facts that Indicate paymg the check 
constitutes bad faith. 75 However, as In the case of an account In 
the name of a "fiduciary as such," if the check Is payable to a 
drawee bank and Is taken by that bank In payment, or as security, 
70. /d. § 6, at 410. 
71. Id. § 6 comment, at 411. ("[H]owever it may very well be that the fiducrary was 
entitled to receive payment out of his prmcrpal's funds, as where the prmcipalis mdebted to 
him for salary, commissions, reimbursements for expenses, dividends, or the like."). 
72. Id. § 7, at 413. ·· 
73. Id. (applies to accounts m the name of the "fiduciary as such"). 
74. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 8, 7A U.L.A. 415 (1985) (applies to accounts m the name 
of the prmcipal). 
75. ld. § 8. 
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for a personal debt of the fiduciary, then the bank IS liable If the 
fiduciary IS, In fact, breachmg her fiduciary obligat10n.76 
7 Sectwn 9: "DeposLt Ln Fiducwry's Personal Ac-
count. "-Sectwn 9 goes further than the sectwns described above, 
and protects the bank even where the fiduciary deposits m her per-
sonal account checks that were payable to her principal or payable 
to her as fiduciary, or checks drawn by her on the beneficiary's 
account, or other fiduciary funds. 77 In that case, the bank may per-
mit withdrawal of the proceeds by personal check of the fiduciary 
without a duty of mquiry78 and, furthermore, without being liable 
for any breach of obligatwn by the fiduciary, unless the bank had 
actual knowledge of the breach or knowledge of such facts that rts 
payment would be deemed bad faith.79 
8. Purpose of the UnL{orm Fiducwnes Act.-As the above 
discusswn Indicates, the U.F.A. generally Imposes upon the benefi-
ciary the risk of fiduciary misappropnatwn of checks or funds 
belongmg to the beneficiary, In the bank's absence of actual knowl-
edge of wrongdomg or knowledge of such facts that completmg the 
transactwn shows dishonesty 80 The only situatwn m whiCh liabil-
Ity 1s Imposed upon a bank, without actual knowledge of 
wrongdoing or bad fa1th,81 IS the case m which a bank takes an 
76. Jd. 
77. Jd. § 9. 
78. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT§ 9, ?A U.L.A. 417 (1985). Contra U.C.C. § 3-307 (1990); see 
m{ra notes 263-312 and accompanymg text. Since rev1sed Article 3 departs from the rule 
stated m U.F.A. section 9, section 9 1s here set out m its entirety: 
If a fiduciary makes a deposit m a bank to h1s personal credit of checks drawn by 
h1m upon an account m h1s own name as fiduc1ary, or of checks drawn to h1m as 
fiduc1ary, or of checks drawn by h1m upon an account m the name of h1s prmctpal if 
he 1s empowered to draw checks thereon, or of checks payable to h1s prmc1pal and 
mdorsed by htm, if he IS empowered to mdorse such checks, or if he otherw1se makes 
a deposit of funds held by h1m as fiduc1ary, the bank rece1vmg such deposit 1s not 
bound to mqmre whether the fiduc1ary IS committing thereby a breach of h1s obliga-
tion as fiduc1ary; and the bank IS authonzed to pay the amount of the deposit or any 
part thereof upon the personal check of the fiduc1ary without bemg liable to the prm-
cipal, unless the bank rece1ves the deposit or pays the check with actual knowledge 
that the fiduciary 1s committing a breach of h1s obligation as fiduc1ary m makmg such 
deposit or m drawmg such check, or with knowledge of such facts that its action m 
rece1vmg the deposit or paymg the check amounts to bad faith. 
UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 417 (1985). 
79. Jd. § 9, at 417. See supra, note 47. 
80. See supra notes 61-79 and accompanymg text. 
81. Th1s assumes, of course, that "the fiduciary as such Is authonzed to receive" the 
money or property pa1d or transferred. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT § 2, 7 A U.L.A. 401 (1985). See 
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item In satisfaction of, or as security for, a debt of the fiduciary, or 
In a transaction otherWise known to be for the benefit of the 
fiduc1ary 82 
Significantly, the U.F.A. specifically reJects the Idea that negli-
gence on the part of a third person dealing with the fiduciary IS 
sufficient to shift the risk of fiduciary misconduct from the benefi-
ciary to the thud party ·83 Such a policy chmce IS of particular 
Importance because several courts In both U.F.A. and non-U.F.A. 
states have Imposed negligence-based liability upon banks dealing 
with disloyal fiduciaries. 84 Furthermore, revised Article 3 defines 
"good faith" as "honesty In fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing," whiCh suggests that Ignoring 
suspicious circumstances would be sufficient to Impose the loss on 
transactors dealing with unfaithful fiduciaries.85 
Seago, Patr1ck, Carmichael & Miller v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 52I So. 2d 674 (La. 
Ct. App. 1988) (bank held not liable for fiduciary mtsappropnations when bank requtred 
corporate resolution authonzmg such fiduciary to write unlimited number of checks on the 
corporation's account, but such authorization did not give the fiduciary the authority to pay 
her personal obligations with corporate funds). 
82. See supra notes 61~79 and accompanymg text. 
83. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Acr § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 396 (1985) ("A thmg IS done 'in good 
faith' withm the meamng of th[e] act, when it ISm fact done honestly, whether it be done 
negligently or not."). See Edwards v. Northwestern Bank, 39 N.C. App. 261, 268, 250 S.E.2d 
651, 656 (1979) ("A showmg of mere negligence IS clearly not sufficient to establish liabil-
ity."), aff'd, 53 N.C. App. 492, 281 S.E.2d 86 (1981) (bank's failure to mquue not sufficient 
to establish "bad faith" m alleged misappropriation of corporate assets); Davis v. Pennsyl- · 
vama Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities, 337 Pa. 456, 459, 12 A.2d 66, 69 (1940) 
(In deciding the question: "At what pomt does negligence cease and bad faith begm?," the 
court noted that: "The distinction between them JS that bad faith, or dishonesty, IS, unlike 
negligence, wilful." The bank was found not liable for accepting a trustee's deposit mto his 
personal account that consisted of checks the tmstee had signed as fiduciary and for paymg 
checks drawn on that account.). See also New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. National Newark 
& Essex Bankmg Co., 117 N.J. Eq. 264, 271, 175 A. 609, 613 (1934) ("The standard of due 
care or negligence and the doctrme of constructive notice m respect of bank deposits of 
fiductary funds find no recognition m the [Uniform] Fiduciaries Act."), aff'd, 119 N.J. Eq. 
540, 182 A. 824 (1936). The bank was found not liable m a recetver's elaborate scheme of 
transferrmg recetvershtp funds to his personal account. New Amsterdam Casualty, 117 N.J. 
at 271, 175 A. at 613. 
84. See mfra notes 283-97 and accompanymg text. 
85. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (I990); see mfra notes 341-46, 350 & 352 and accompanymg 
text (extent to which the new "good faith" definition Imposes a freedom from negligence 
standard). 
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B. Former U C. C. Artwle 3 
At three separate Junctures, former Article 3 of the U.C.C. 
provided rules to gmde the courts' allocatiOn of risk for fiduciary 
fraud between banks and their customers: sectiOn 3-117,86 proper 
form of mdorsement; sectiOn 3-206,87 applicatiOn of the proceeds of 
a restrictively mdorsed Item; and, most sigmficantly, sectiOn 3-
304,88 fiduciary fraud rules m the context of notice of claims or 
defenses of priOr parties, one of the essential elements of the 
"holder-m-due-course" doctnne. The discussiOn that follows treats 
the scope of each of these provisiOns, their applicatiOn m decided 
cases and their InterrelatiOn. 
1. Former UC.C. Sectwn 3-117-Discusswn of U.C.C. pro-
VISIOns that have an Impact on bank liability for fiduciary fraud 
begms appropriately With a former Article 3 sectiOn that provided 
a rule of constructiOn. SectiOn 3-117 determmed the party to whom 
an mstrument was properly payable. 89 This was of consequence be-
cause the bank that paid the wrong party might have been liable In 
conversiOn to the true owner of the Item.9° Conversely, the bank 
that paid m a manner consistent with the payee/indorsee line 
might have properly argued, pursuant to former sectiOn 3-117, that 
It had done all It should have done to ensure that the fiduciary was 
not provided, by the bank's actiOns, the opportunity to defraud the 
beneficiary 91 Instruments payable to a named mdiv1dual (for pre-
sent purposes, a fiduciary) as the agent of a specified person92 were 
payable to the specified person, but the agent nevertheless "could 
act as If he were the holder."93 The accompanymg comment to for-
mer subsectiOn 3-117(a) offered four examples of such payee or 
Indorsee lines: 
"John Doe, Treasurer of Town of Framingham," 
"John Doe, President Home Telephone Co.," 
"John Doe, Secretary of City Club," or 
86. u.c.c. § 3-117 (1989). 
87. /d. § 3-206. 
88. I d. § 3-304. 
89. See cd. § 3-117. 
90. See cd. § 3-419(1)(c). 
91. /d. § 3-419(3). 
92. /d. § 1-201(30) ("'Person' mcludcs an mdiv1dual or an orgamzation "). 
93. Id. § 3-117(a). 
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"John Doe, Agent of Richard Roe."94 
The 3-117 rule was designed to effectuate general commercial ex-
pectat10ns that a party so drawing or Indorsing a check Intended to 
make the Instrument payable to the beneficiary, but yet also au-
thorized the fiduciary to deal with the Instrument on behalf of the 
beneficiary 9~ Note that the principal/agent relationship addressed 
by former subsection 3-117(a)96 described only one form of fiduci-
ary relationship within the scope of the U.F.A.97 
SubsectiOn (b) of former sectiOn 3-117 encompassed all of the 
other fiduciary relationships not contemplated by subsection (a), 
and provided that an item made payable In a form such as the 
following: 
"John Doe, Trustee of Smithers Trust," 
"John Doe, Administrator of the Estate of Richard Roe," or 
"John Doe, Executor under Will of Richard Roe," 
was payable to the named fiduciary, John Doe, who, as personal 
representative, would 'be liable to the beneficiary for any breach of 
fiduciary duty 98 The comment99 accompanying subsection (b)1°0 
tied sectiOn 3-117 Into the general "notice to purchaser" provisiOn 
of former section 3-304/01 by explaining that 
[a]ny subsequent holder of the mstrument IS put on notice of the 
fiduciary position, and IS not a holder m due course if he takes 
with notice that John Doe has negotiated the mstrument m pay-
ment of or as security for his own debt or m any transaction for his 
own benefit, or otherwise m breach of duty.102 
While the comment to subsection 3-117(b) did not specifically re-
fer to an Instrument made payable In the form contemplated by 
subsectiOn (a)/03 there was no reason to treat the two cases differ-
94. Id. § 3-117 comment 1. 
95. See U.C.C. § 3-117(a) & (b) (1989). 
96. Id. § 3-117(a). 
97. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Acr § 1(1), 7A U.L.A. 395-96 (1985) (definition of "fiduciary"). 
Rev1sed Article 3 also offers a broad definition of "fiduciary" that would encompass the 
relationships contemplated by former section 3-117(a). See also supra note 57. 
98. U.C.C. § 3-117 comment 2 (1989). 
99. Id. § 3-117 comment 2. 
100. ld. § 3-117(b). 
101. Id. § 3-304. 
102. Id. § 3-117 comment 2. See also U.C.C. §§ 3-110(c)(2) & 3-307(b) (1990). 
103. U.C.C. § 3-117(a) (1989). 
496 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 42:2:475 
ently Therefore, former section 3-304104 should have applied to the 
subsectwn 3-117(a)1°6 context JUSt as It applied to the subsectiOn 3-
117(b)106 context. 
Finally, former subsectwn (c)1°7 provided a "catch-all" rule; m 
the case of an Instrument made payable, with additional words of 
descnptwn not Withm the scope of subsectwns (a)1°8 and (b)/09 
and therefore not m a manner that suggested the payee Is actmg In 
a representative capacity for another party, the mstrument Is pay-
able to the payee absolutely, and subsequent parties can therefore 
Ignore such additwnal words of descnptwn110 with Impunity The 
rule of former subsectiOn 3-117(c)111 extends to cases m which the 
representative capacity of the payee, but not the Identity of the 
party represented, Is designated.112 While the language of the for 
mer subsectiOn (c) and comment 3 makes clear that words of 
descnptwn alone113 are not sufficient to Impart notice that would 
compromise a subsequent taker's holder In due course status, 114 It 
remams the case that such notice can be established by reference 
to other cucumstances surrounding the fiduciary's negotiatiOn of 
the mstrument. 116 
The cases construmg former sectwn 3-117116 are not legwn. 
Four dec1s10ns,117 however, are pertment so far as fiduciary fraud 
Issues are concerned. In Fe~nstez,n v. Chemz,cal Bank, 118 a New 
104. Id. § 3-304. 
105. Id. § 3-117(a). 
106. Id. § 3-117(b}. 
I07. Id. § 3-117(c). 
108. Id. § 3-117(a). 
109. Id. § 3-117(b}. 
110. Id. § 3-117 comment 3 (offers examples of subsection (c) payee lines: "John Doe, 
1121 Mam Street," "John Doe, Attorney," or "Jane Doe, unremarned Widow"). 
111. Id. § 3-117(c). 
112. Id. § 3-117 comment 3. Thus, former section 3-117(c) applied to "any descnption 
of the payee as 'Treasurer, 'President, Agent, 'Trustee, 'Executor, or 'Admimstrator, 
wh1eh does not name the prmcipal or beneficiary." Id. 
113. U.C.C. § 3-117 comment 3 (I989) ("words of descnption are to be treated as 
mere IdentificatiOn"}. 
114. Id. § 3-117 comment 3 ("Any subsequent party dealing with the mstrument may 
disregard the descnption and treat the paper as payable unconditionally "). 
115. Id. § 3-117 comment 3 ("fully protected [only] m the absence of mdependent 
notice of other facts sufficient to affect his position"). 
116. ld. § 3-117. 
117. See mfra notes 118-65 and accompanymg text. 
118. 84 A.D.2d 514, 443 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1981), a/f'd, 56 N.Y.2d 571, 435 N.E.2d 404, 450 
N.Y.S.2d 187 (1982}. 
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York state appellate court considered an attorney's negotiation of 
an Instrument, Issued pursuant to a divorce settlement, that was 
payable to "Herbert Mildner, Att., Selma Goldin."119 The court ap-
plied former subsectiOn 3-117(b)120 to support Its conclusiOn that 
the mstrument was payable to the attorney, and that his Indorse-
ment alone was therefore sufficient to negotiate the check.121 So 
the bank that had taken the item was a holder, notwithstanding 
the absence of Ms. Goldin's Indorsement on the check.122 Since the 
necessary Indorsement was proVIded by the attorney, as fiduciary, 
the bank took a properly payable Item even though the beneficiary 
did not Indorse.123 Of course, notwithstanding the bank's lack of 
culpability, attorney Mildner might still be liable to his client, the 
beneficiary, for any misuse of the proceeds. 
Similarly, In In re Knox/24 a bank that paid the proceeds of a 
check to a fiduciary, the beneficiary's father, was not liable to the 
child when the father used a portion of the proceeds to benefit not 
only the child, but also other members of the family 125 The signa-
ture of the father was sufficient to negotiate the check, 126 and there 
was nothing In former sectiOn 3-117127 to Impose upon the bank, 
which took the item as Indorsed, an obligatiOn to ensure that the 
proceeds of the check were, In fact, used solely In a manner consis-
tent with the beneficiary's Interests.128 
In two other decisions, the courts were confronted with a 
payee line that was less than clear regarding the Identity of the 
proper payee. In one of these decisions, West Penn Adm£n£stratwn 
v. Unwn Natwnal Bank, 129 the Pennsylvania court considered an 
item that had been made payable to the order of" 'Pittsburgh Na-
119. Femstem, 84 A.D.2d at 514, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 357. 
120. u.c.c. § 3-117(b) (1989). 
121. Femstem, 84 A.D.2d at 514, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 357. 
122. See td. The court also noted that the beneficiary had failed to object to the 
bank's previous processmg of s1milarly drawn checks. Id. at 514, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 358. 
123. See U.C.C. § 3-U7(b) (1989). In Femstem, the attorney deposited the check mto 
h1s personal account, but the plamtiff apparently did not attempt to 1mpose liability on the 
bank based on that fact alone. See Femstem, 84 A.D.2d at 514, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 357-58. 
124. 64 N.Y.2d 434, 477 N.E.2d 448, 488 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1985). 
125. In re Knox, 64 N.Y.2d at 437, 477 N.E.2d at 450, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 148. 
126. See cd. 
127. u.c.c. § 3-117 (1989). 
128. In re Knox, 64 N.Y.2d at 437-38, 477 N.E.2d 450, 488 N.Y.S.2d 148. 
129. 233 Pa. Super. 311, 335 A.2d 725 (1975). 
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twnal Bank Carpenters Contribut10n Account.' "130 The West 
Penn court found that Pittsburgh Natwnal Bank was the payee of 
the Item;131 so the separate Indorsement of the contributwn ac-
count was not necessary 132 Subsect10n 3-117(c)133 was relied upon 
m support of the concluswn that the words "Carpenters Contribu-
twn Account" were merely descriptive, and had no Impact on the 
title to the paper.134 
The Califorma Court of Appeals, m Joffe v. Um,ted Californw 
Bank, 135 considered a payee line somewhat similar to that at Issue 
In the West Penn case.136 The Joffes had obtained a teller's check 
from Allstate Savings and Loan Associatwn made payable to 
"Continental Financial Systems-Wells Fargo Escrow Trust Ac-
count."137 The Jo.ffes then remitted the check to Continental as 
payment for Investment property Apparently, the land deal was a 
scam to whiCh the Joffes were victim. Contmental had mstructed 
the Joffes how to draw the check, and Continental then took the 
check and deposited It m an account denommated "Continental 
Financial Systems," maintained at Bank of America ("BA").138 
The depositary, BA, credited the check to Contmental's account 
and forwarded the Item to United California Bank ("UCB"), the 
drawee/payor, for payment.139 The check was paid by UCB and 
was charged agamst Allstate's account. 140 The Joffes, as assignees 
of the nghts of the drawer Allstate, brought breach of warranty141 
and negligence actwns against BA as well as wrongful payment142 
130. West Penn, 233 Pa. Super. at 321, 335 A.2d at 729. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. at 321, 335 A.2d at 730. 
133. U.C.C. § 3-117(c) (1989). 
134. West Penn Admm. v. Umon Nat'l Bank, 233 Pa. Super. 311, 325, 335 A.2d 725, 
731 (1975). 
135. 141 Cal. App. 3d 541, 190 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1983). 
136. Compare Joffe v. United Cal. Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 541, 550, 190 Cal. Rptr. 443, 
447 (1983) (payee line read: "Continental Financtal Systems-Wells Fargo Escrow Trust 
Account") Wlth West Penn Admm. v. Umon Nat'l Bank, 233 Pa. Super. 311, 321, 335 A.2d 
725, 729 (1975) (payee line read: "Pittsburgh National Bank Carpenters ContributiOn 
Account"). 





142. See U.C.C. §§ 4-401 & 4-207(1)(a) (1989). 
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and negligence actiOns against UCB.143 The tnal court sustained 
the defendants' demurrers to all four causes of actiOn, and the Jof-
fes appealed.144 
The appellate court considered each of the four causes of ac-
tion and found that three of the four withstood demurrer.145 Of 
concern here IS the court's treatment of the breach of presentment 
warranty claim against BA.146 The Joffes argued that, because the 
check had not been properly Indorsed, the depositary paid the 
item over an Improper, unauthorized Indorsement and therefore 
did not have good title to the item.147 The payor responded that 
the words "Wells Fargo Escrow Trust Account" were merely de-
scriptive of Continental, , and therefore, sectiOn 3-117148 validated 
the form of Indorsement. Under this constructiOn, the depositary 
did have good title and had not therefore breached a presentment 
warranty to BA, the drawee/payor.149 
The court analyzed the applicatiOn of subsectiOns 3-117(b) 
and (c)/Go and found that neither applied to validate the Indorse-
ment relied upon by the depositary 151 The court deemed 
subsection 3-117(b)152 Inapposite "because the payee line does not 
describe Continental's fiduciary capacity 1' 153 The court then 
turned to subsectiOn 3-117(c)/54 and held that provision Inapplica-
143. Joffe v. United Cal. Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 541, 547, 190 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445 
(1983). 
144. Joffe, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 547, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 445. 
145. /d. at 548, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The three causes of action withstanding demur-
rer were: (1) that BA had negligently breached its duty of due care by accepting the item for 
deposit mto Continental's account; (2) that BA had breached its warranty of good title 
under the Califorma versiOn of U.C.C. section 4-207(1)(a); and (3) that UCB had Improperly 
paid the item over an Improper mdorsement m breach of UCB's agreement with drawer 
Allstate to honor only properly payable items. ld. 
146. ld. at 548-57, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 446-52. 
147. /d. at 548, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 446. 
148. u.c.c. § 3-117 (1989). 
149. Joffe, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 447. Also, m·Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. 
United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978), the Califorma 
Supreme Court also recogmzed that a drawer could have standing to brmg a breach of pre-
sentment warranty action by charactenzmg the drawer as an "other payor." Sun 'N Sand, 
Inc., 21 Cal. 3d at 682, 582 P.2d at 928, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 337. 
150. U.C.C. § 3-117(b) & (c) (1989). 
151. Joffe v. United Cal. Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 541, 550-52, 190 Cal. Rptr. 443, 447-
49 (1983). 
152. u.c.c. § 3-117(b) (1989). 
153. Joffe, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 448. 
154. U.C.C. § 3-117(c) (1989). 
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ble "because the words 'Wells Fargo Escrow Trust Account' do not 
patently Identify or describe Contznental, but appear rather to 
Identify an escrow or trust at Wells Fargo Bank."1~~ The deposi-
tary nonetheless urged that on the basis of the West Penn 1~6 
decisiOn, the form of Indorsement and therefore BA's good title to 
the mstrument should be upheld. 1 ~7 
But the appellate court was not convmced, and distmgmshed 
West Penn. 1 ~8 In West Penn, the Pennsylvania Supenor Court 
concluded that the mdorsement of Pittsburgh NatiOnal Bank alone 
m that case was sufficient because agreements established the 
Carpenters ContributiOn Account and authorized Pittsburgh Na-
tional Bank to act as depositary of funds for the contributiOn 
account; and the parties had also authonzed the bank to make 
payments out of the account on behalf of the beneficiaries of the 
account.159 Insofar as BA had no such agreement or authority on 
the Joffe facts/60 the bank could not rely upon the form of m-
dorsement provided by Contmental to absolve It from liability 161 
More mterestmg Is the court's recognition that the plamt1ffs, 
the Joffes, could brmg a negligence action against the depositary 
for having taken an Item payable to Continental as fiduciary for 
deposit to Continental's mdiv1dual account.162 The court con-
cluded, m fact, that once former sectiOn 3-117163 was found 
mapplicable, the depositary and all who claimed through the de-
positary would be potentially liable for their negligent handling of 
155. Joffe, I4I Cal. App. 3d at 551, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 448. 
I56. West Penn Admm. v. Umon Nat'l Bank, 233 Pa. Super. 311, 325, 335 A.2d 725, 
731 (1975) (merely descnptive language does not mvalidate an otherwise effective 
mdorsement). 
157. Joffe v. United Cal. Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 541, 551, 190 Cal. Rptr. 443, 448 
(1983). 
158. Joffe, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 448. 
159. West Penn, 233 Pa. Super. at 325, 335 A.2d at 731. 
160. See Joffe, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 448. 
161. See td. at 55I-52, I90 Cal Rptr. at 448. 
162. Joffe, at 552-53, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1114 (1981)). The court addressed the tssue of whether Continental 
Financtal Systems and Wells Fargo Escrow Trust Account were "jomt payees." The court 
used a dictionary definition of the word "hyphen" to determme that a hyphen between two 
names mdicates JUSt one payee. I d. Section 3-110 of former Article 3 could therefore be used 
to determme the liability of the parties that accommodate perpetration of a fraud by enforc 
mg the "conspicuously designated on its face" language of the section. See U.C.C. § 3-110(1) 
(1989). 
163. u.c.c. § 3-117 (1989). 
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the item. 164 The court then remanded on the grounds that there 
was an Issue of fact concerning the bank's negligence.165 Such a 
finding would support the ImpositiOn of liability upon the deposi-
tary In favor of the Joffes, as beneficiaries, for the fraud of their 
fiduciary Continenta1.2 
2. Former U.C.C. Sectwn 3-206.-Fiduciary fraud considera-
tiOns may be directly presented In the context of Instruments 
bearmg certain restrictive Indorsements. Former section 3-205166 
described an Indorsement that "states that it Is for the benefit or 
use of the Indorser or of another person" as a restrictive Indorse-
ment/67 and former section 3-206168 described the consequences 
that attend negotiatiOn of an Instrument restrictively Indorsed.169 
The effect of former subsection 3-206(4)170 IS twofold: (1) to Impose 
on the first taker of a restrictively Indorsed Instrument the duty to 
pay, or apply value, consistently with the restrictive Indorsement; 
and (2) to make clear that no subsequent transferee Is encumbered 
by the duty to assure that value was In fact properly credited.171 
If, therefore, a check Is Indorsed "Pay to B, as trustee for A" 
and depositary bank allows B to deposit the check In his personal 
account, bank has no duty to see that the funds are properly ap-
plied. If the fiduciary subsequently breaches the trust by 
withdrawing the funds for non-trust purposes, the bank has no lia-
bility to the beneficiary unless the bank acts In bad faith or Is on 
164. Joffe v. United Cal. Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 541, 552-55, 190 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-
50 (1983). 
165. Joffe 141 Cal. App. 3d at 558, 190 Cal. Rptr. 452-53 (lower court's dismissal of 
plamtiff's cause of action was reversed). 
166. u.c.c. § 3-205 (1989). 
167. u.c.c. § 3-205(d) (1989). 
I68. /d. § 3-206. 
169. /d. § 3-206(4). Former subsection 3-206(4) provided: 
The first taker under an mdorsement for the benefit of the mdorser or another person 
(subparagraph (d) of Section 3-205) must pay or apply any value given by him for or 
on the security of the mstrument consistently with the mdorsement and to the extent 
that he does so he becomes a holder for value. In addition such taker IS a holder m 
due course if he otherwise complies with the requuements of Section 3-302 on what 
constitutes a holder m due course. A later holder for value IS neither given notice nor 
otherwise affected by such restrictive mdorsement unless he has knowledge that a 
fiduciary or other person has negotiated the mstrument m any transaction for his 
own benefit or otherwise m breach of duty (subsection (2} of Section 3-304}. 
/d. § 3-206(4). 
170. /d. 
171. /d. 
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notice of the breach of fiduciary duty Mere knowledge that the 
check IS bemg deposited In the trustee's personal account IS 
neither evidence of bad faith nor notice of a breach of fiduciary 
duty 172 
The comment to former sectiOn 3-206173 explained the limited 
scope of the protectiOn of subsectiOn 3-206(4): "Whether transfer 
ees from [the fiduc1ary] have not1ce of a breach of trust such as to 
deny them the status of holders m due course 1s governed by the 
sectiOn on notice to purchasers (SectiOn 3-304); the trust mdorse-
ment does not of 1tself g1ve such notiCe."174 Th1s comment clar1fied 
the operatiOn of subsectiOn (4)175 m the fiduc1ary fraud case. So far 
as the first taker, e.g., a depos1tary bank, of a restnct1vely 1ndorsed 
Instrument for the benefit of a benefic1ary 1s concerned, value 
g1ven for the 1tem must be given 1n a manner consistent w1th the 
1ndorsement.176 Therefore, 1n terms of the restnctive Indorsement 
analys1s, the fiduc1ary's transferees, such as the depos1tary g1ve 
value for holder 1n due course purposes by g1vmg value to the fidu-
ciary177 whether or not the fiduc1ary absconds with the proceeds of 
the Item. What does matter IS whether the depositary bank had 
notice of the fiduciary's defalcatiOn, and that was a matter Withm 
the purv1ew of former sectiOn 3-304,178 not a matter of value under 
former sectiOn 3-303.179 
The former sectiOn 3-206180 Issues of concern, for the purposes 
of th1s portion of the Article, mvolve cases m which courts have 
been called upon to consider whether the depos1tary did m fact 
apply value m a manner cons1stent w1th a restnct1ve mdorsement 
and the mterests of the trust. AllegatiOns of m1sapplicat10n are 
premised on the tort of conversiOn because the defendant would 
have taken an actiOn mconsistent w1th the nght, title, or claim of 
another.181 SectiOn 3-419182 of Art1cle 3 concerned the conversiOn 
172. See td. § 3-206 comment 6; mfra text accompanymg notes 256-66. 
173. u.c.c. § 3-206 (1989). 
174. ld. § 3-206 comment 6. 
175. /d. § 3-206(4). 
176. u.c.c. § 307(b) (1990). 
177. U.C.C. § 3-303(a) (1989). 
178. I d. § 3-304. 
179. ld. § 3-303. 
180. /d. § 3-206. 
181. See PWA Farms, Inc. v. North Platte State Bank, 220 Neb. 516, 518-19, 371 
N.W.2d 102, 105 (1985); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (6th ed. 1990); W KEETON. D. DOBBS. 
R. KEETON. & D. OwEN, PRossER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTS § 15 (5th ed. 1984). 
182. u.c.c. § 3-419 (1989). 
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of commercial paper, but did not specify the scope of conversiOn 
theory applicable to commercial paper. However, by negative Infer-
ence from former subsection 3-419(3)183 and from supplementary 
common law pnnciples184 Incorporated by operatiOn of sectiOn 1-
103,185 a conversiOn actiOn would lie against a depositary that paid 
In a manner Inconsistent with a restnctive Indorsement. 186 
Three cases, In particular, are noteworthy for their treatment 
of the conversiOn Issues raised when a depositary fails to apply 
value consistently with a restrictive Indorsement and thereby ac-
commodates the fiduciary's fraud on her beneficiary First, In re 
Quantum Development Corp.187 dealt with the liability of a depos-
Itary bank that Improperly applied the proceeds of a restnctively 
Indorsed item. Although the court could find no specific U.C.C. 
sectiOn that it believed established the liability of a depositary for 
such an erroneous actiOn, it construed the pervasive statutory 
scheme of Article 3 to accommodate the Imposition of liability on 
the depositary 188 From those premises the court distilled its 
holding: 
183. Former subsection 3-419(3) provided: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act concermng restnctive mdorsements a representa-
tive, mcluding a depositary or collecting bank, who has m good faith and m 
accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the busmess of 
such representative dealt with an mstrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was 
not the true owner IS not liable m conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond 
the amount of any proceeds rema1mng m h1s hands. 
Id. § 3-419(3). 
184. See mfra notes 187-89. 
185. u.c.c. § 1-103 (1989). 
186. ld. ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the prmc1ples of 
law and equity shall supplement its provisions."). For cases 1mposmg conversiOn liability 
on a depositary bank, see AmSouth Bank, N. A. v. Reliable Janitonal Serv., 548 So. 2d 1365 
(Ala. 1989); PWA Farms v. North Platte State Bank, 220 Neb. 516, 371 N.W.2d 102 (1985); 
Humberto Decorators v. Plaza Nat'l Bank, 180 N.J. Super. 170, 434 A.2d 618 (1981); Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co. v. South Windsor Bank & Trust Co., 171 Conn. 63, 368 A.2d 76 
(1976); Yeager & Sullivan, Inc. v. Farmers Bank, 162 Ind; App. 15, 317 N.E.2d 792 (1974). 
187. 397 F Supp. 329 (D. V.I. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. demed, 429 U.S. 
827 (1976). 
188. In re Quantum Dev., 397 F Supp. at 336-37. The court noted, first, that former 
section 3-206(2) did not apply to depositary banks and that here BNS was a depositary. 
Second, by negative Implication, former section 3-419(4) provided a remedy m conversiOn 
agamst a depositary bank that failed to pay according to a restnctive mdorsement. Third, 
former section 3-419(3) Imposed conversion liability on the depositary if it failed to act m 
accordance with "reasonable commercial standards." Fourth, former section 3-603 made an 
explicit exception to its general rule not requmng payor banks to obey a stop order Issued 
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The common law rule, sifted from both case precedent and the 
respected treatises m the field, suggest [sic] that if a bank receives a 
deposit with mstruct10ns to place it to the credit of a fiduciary m his 
representative capacity, and mstead credits it to the mdividual ac 
count of the fiduciary, the bank IS liable m conversion if the deposit 
Is later disbursed by the trustee for nontrust purposes.189 
Because the depositary had Issued certificates of deposit to the 
fiduciary personally, the court found that the beneficiary would be 
able to recover the amount of the CDs from the depositary 190 The 
depositary argued that the beneficiary could not recover because 
the depositary was a holder In due course. 191 The court concluded 
that former sectiOn 3-306192 only provided that a depositary was 
not "ipso facto" given notice by a restrictive trust mdorsement. 193 
Because the depositary had not applied the funds represented by 
the check m a manner consistent with the mdorsement, former 
subsectiOn 3-206(2) "immunity" was not available to the deposi-
tary 194 In that case, the beneficiary would have a viable conversiOn 
actwn. 
The New York Court of Appeals, In Underp1-nnr,ng & Founda-
twn Constructors v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 196 recognized 
that "the prime functiOn of [fiduciary fraud loss allocatiOn] rules 
IS to Impose liability on the party which could most readily 
have prevented the fraud."196 An employee had company checks 
Issued to named payees Intending them to have no Interest; the 
employee restrictively Indorsed the checks "for deposit" over the 
forged signatures of the named payees, but deposited the checks 
by an mdorser m the case of a depositary that satisfies the holder of an item that has been 
mdorsed mcons1stently with a restrictive mdorsement. Finally, the court stated that sectiOn 
I-103 was provided by the drafters of the Code to demonstrate that particular U.C.C. provi-
siOns are not exclusive; thus, common law prmc1ples remam m force. 
I89. In re Quantum Dev., 397 F Supp. at 337 (citmg Bank of Giles County v. Fidelity 
& Deposit Co., 84 F.2d 32I, 326-27 (4th Cir. 1936}). See generally Duckett v. National 
Mechamcs' Bank, 86 Md. 400, 38 A. 983 (1897); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 324 
comment e {1959); BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 906 (2d ed. I962). 
190. In re Quantum Dev., 397 F Supp. at 338. 
191. In re Quantum Dev., 397 F Supp. 329, 337 (D.V.I. I975), aff'd on other grounds, 
534 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. demed, 429 U.S. 827 (I976). 
192. u.c.c. § 3-206 (1972). 
193. In re Quantum Dev., 397 F Supp. at 337. 
I94. Id. 
195. 46 N.Y.2d 459, 386 N.E.2d 1319, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1979). 
196. Underpmmng, 46 N.Y.2d at 469, 386 N.E.2d at 1324, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 303. 
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Into his personal account or the accounts of confederates. The 
court acknowledged that had the check bearing the forged Indorse-
ment In the case not been restrictively Indorsed, the loss would 
have properly been borne by the drawer of the check by operatiOn 
of former section 3-405.197 The court determined, however, that the 
existence of the restrictive Indorsement changed matters pro-
foundly· "By disregarding the restrictiOn, [the depositary] not only 
subJects itself to liability for any losses resultmg from its actions, 
but it also passes up what may well be the best opportunity to 
prevent the fraud.mss The court deemed deposit Into the account 
of someone other than the restrictive Indorser ''an obvious warning 
sign.m99 
In Bnte L'lte Lamps Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Co.,200 another New York court reached the same conclusiOn as the 
Quantum Development court and relied on much of the Under-
p'lnn'lng analysis to support the conversiOn actiOn against the 
depositary that made a payment Inconsistent with a restrictive In-
dorsement. Bnte L'lte, an employee defalcatiOn case, Involved an 
employee's theft of checks already Indorsed "for deposit only" 
from her employer.201 The court recognized the viability of four po-
tential causes of actiOn brought by the employer-payee of the 
restrictively Indorsed checks:202 "(1) money had and received;[203] 
I97. I d. at 462-63, 386 N.E.2d at 1320, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 299. In th1s case, the employee, 
Walker, was an agent for Underpmmng & Foundation Constructors ("Underpmmng") and 
was supplymg the drawer Underpmnmg with the name of the payee for the checks, m-
tending that the payee have no mterest m the mstruments. Th1s 1s the type of fact situation 
contemplated by former section 3-405(1)(c). See U.C.C. § 3-405 comment 3 (1989). There-
fore, but for the restr1ctive mdorsement that shifted liability to the depositary bank, the 
drawer would have borne the loss. See U.C.C. ~ 3-419(3) (1989) (conversiOn action may lie 
where depositary fails to honor restnctive mdorsement). 
198. Underpmmng, 46 N.Y.2d at 469, 386 N.E.2d at 1324, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 303. 
199. Jd. 
200. 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1221 (N.Y. Sup: Ct. 1982). 
201. Brite Lite, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1223; see also Underpmnmg & 
Found. Constructors v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 46 N.Y.2d 459,464, 386 N.E.2d 1319, 
1320-21, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (1979). See generally mfra notes 337-47 & 366-73 and the 
accompanymg text. 
202. See Underpmmng & Found. Constructors v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 46 
N.Y.2d 459, 464, 386 N.E.2d 1319, 1320-21, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (1979) (cited m Brite 
Lite, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1223). The plamtiff was the drawer of the check. 
The court found that the drawer was a proper plamtiff and that a cause of action could lie 
agamst the depositary, thereby reJecting the holdings m Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. 
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962); and Life Ins. Co. v. 
Snyder, 141 N.J. Super. 539, 358 A.2d 859 (1976); and mstead, adopting the conclus10n 
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(2) negligence; (3) conversion; and (4) breach of contract."204 The 
same facts that would support the conversiOn and negligence theo-
rres were also deemed sufficient by the Bnte L-Lte court to support 
a breach of contract actiOn against the depositary 205 The fact that 
the plaintiff was a depositor at the defendant-depositary bank gave 
nse to a contractual relatiOn between the plamtiff and the defend-
ant and the payment Inconsistent with the restnctive Indorsement 
constituted a breach of that contract. 206 
From the plaintrff's perspective, there IS both a good and a 
bad side to the court's recognitiOn of the bank's liability based 
upon breach of contract theory First, smce the court found that 
the plambff's act10n sounded m contract, punitive damages would 
not be available. That would matter little to the plaintiff In cases 
such as Bnte Lr,te and Underpr,nnr,ng because recovery of punitive 
damages would be possible only If a successful plamtiff demon-
strated a willful, maliciOus, and IntentiOnal wrongdomg on the part 
of the defendant. 207 Therefore, an award of pumtive damages 
would have been highly Improbable smce the depositary would al-
most have to have been a JOint tortfeasor with the fraudulent 
employee to support exemplary recovery Nevertheless, because 
the court recogmzed the availability of a cOincident negligence ac-
reached m Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 67I, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. 329 (1978); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Atlas Supply Co., 12I Ga. App. 1, 172 S.E.2d 
632 (1970); and Clarkson v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super. 373, 406 A.2d 494 
(1979). 
203. See Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 902, 587 P.2d 1071, 
1075 (1978) (holding that "money had and received" IS an ancient common-law remedy, 
based on quasi-contract or contract Implied-m-law, with equitable overtones); Weiss v. Mar-
cus, 51 Cal. App. 3d 590, 599, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (1975) ("An action for money had and 
rece1ved lies wherever one person has received money whiCh belongs to another, and which 
m equity and good conscience should be paid over to the latter."). 
204. Bnte Ltte, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1222. 
205. /d. at 1223. 
206. /d. 
207. See Brite Lite Lamps Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1221, 1225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 
N.Y.2d 354, 358, 353 N.E.2d 793, 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1976); Halpm v. Prudent1al 
Ins. Co., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 907, 401 N.E.2d 171, 171, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 48 (1979)). See also P 
ALCES. THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS ~ 2.02[6)[b], at 2-39 n.220 (1989) (courts 
have generally held that a showmg of "wanton, willful, malicwus, oppress1ve or at least reck-
less behavwr" IS reqmred to support an award for exemplary damages). But see Willoughby 
Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (critic1zmg 
Garrity), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Belko v. AVX Corp., 204 Cal. App. 3d 894, 251 
Cal. Rptr. 557 (1988) (ordered not to be officially published) (disagreemg with Gamty). 
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twn, an Intentional tort actiOn would lie, In any event,208 In 
appropriate circumstances. 
Second, and even more Importantly from the plaintiff's per-
spective, because the Bnte L"tte court concluded that the actiOn 
against the depositary sounded In contract, affirmative negligence 
defenses would be Inapposite. 209 While this conclusiOn may be 
questwnable,210 the possible loss of such defenses adds an Interest-
Ing wrinkle to the Issue of bank liability for fiduciary fraud. 
In stark contrast to the contract theory posited 1n the Bnte 
Ltte decisiOn, as well as the conversiOn and strict liability theory 
otherwise available 1n former sectiOn 3-206 situatiOns, the negli-
gence analysts pursued by the cases JUst discussed, has Introduced 
a substantial degree of uncertainty As the discussiOn In the next 
sectiOn of the Article demonstrates, reliable rules are elusive In the 
negligence JUrisprudence. 
3. Former U.C.C. Sectwn 3-304.-Perhaps the central Article 
3 provisiOn In the fiduciary fraud matrix was former sectiOn 3-304, 
the U.C.C.'s statement of notice rules, for purposes of determtnmg 
of holder 1n due course status.211 The Article 3 notice concept gen-
208. Brite Lite, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1225 ("Even cons1dermg the 
plamtiff's tort theor1es, the defendant's conduct m th1s matter does not nse to a cla1m 
for punitive damages."). 
209. I d. ("Moreover, the defenses of the plamtiff's alleged negligence would not obvi-
ate or mitigate the defendant's damages herem smce these defenses are available only m 
tort actions and do not apply to a breach of contract cla1m (see L1ppes v. Atlantic Bank, [69 
A.D.2d I27, 141, 419 N.Y.S.2d 505, 513 (1979)]), wh1ch 1s the bas1s of the court's dec1s1on 
herem."). 
2IO. Cf. M. BENFIELD & P ALcEs, CoMMERCIAL PAPER AND ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYs-
TEMS 259-364 (1987) (chapter, entitled "Tort Analys1s and Commerc1al Paper Problems," 
demonstrating that courts have, to an extent, merged tort -and contract law theones). Illus-
trative of the merger of tort and contract law 1s the former section 4-401 establishment of a 
contract-based relationship between the bank and its customer, at least to the extent that 
the breach of the duty 1mposed by that section g1ves nse to a breach of contract cla1m. 
Courts have applied the former section 4-103(5)- tort based-limitation of damages to the 
4-40I action. See, e.g., Isaac v. Amencan Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 675 P.2d 742 (Colo. 
1984); H.B.A. Fur Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 955 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I984); but see Cincmnati Ins. Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of Akron, 63 
Oh10 St. 2d 220, 407 N.E.2d 519 (1980). 
211. See U.C.C. § 3-302 (1989) (prov1ding that a "holder m due course" 1s a holder 
who takes for value, and m good faith, and without notice of defenses). See also U.C.C. § 1-
201(25) (1989), prov1ding that a person has "notice" of a fact if: 
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; 
(b) he has rece1ved a notice or notification of it; 
(c) from all the facts and cucumstances known to h1m at the time m question he 
has reason to know that it ex1sts. 
Id. § 1-201(25). 
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erally contemplated applicatiOn of an objective standard; a party IS 
deemed to have notice of that which she should reasonably have 
known.212 The treatment of notice of fiduciary fraud under former 
subsectiOn 3-304(2), however, cast the mqmry In subjective terms 
by mcorporatmg actual knowledge: "The purchaser[213] has notice 
of a clmm against the mstrument when he has knowledge that a 
fiduciary has negotiated the Instrument m payment of or as secur-
Ity for his own debt or m any transactiOn for his own benefit or 
otherwise m breach of duty "214 So, apparently, Ignorance, even m-
excusable Ignorance, was an excuse so far as former subsectiOn 3-
304(2) notice of fiduciary fraud was concerned.215 However, It 
should be noted that when an Instrument IS transferred by the fi-
duciary In payment of her own debt, or otherwise for her own 
benefit, such transfer Is not necessarily a breach of duty There-
fore, except to the extent that former subsectiOn 3-304(2)216 
applied to transfers known to be In breach of duty, former sectwn 
3-304 actually stated a "notice" rule; m other words, the taker's 
knowledge that the fiduciary had transferred the mstrument for 
her own benefit, was "not1ce" that she might have been transfer-
nng m breach of duty 217 
Former sectwn 3-304 cases often presented the type of factual 
scenanos that have been cntlcized as makmg bad law 218 Generally, 
the beneficiary has been viCtimized by her fiductary, and the finan-
2I2. Cf. J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CooE 630 (3d ed. 1988) ("A 
court's power to find notice when the holder 'has reason to know' that somethmg ex1sts on 
the bas1s of the 'facts and circumstances known to h1m' mtroduces at least the flavor of the 
objective-subjective fight. It IS a short step from that definition to say that one 'knows what 
a reasonably prudent man m h1s Circumstances 'knows'"). 
213. See U.C.C. § l-20I(32) & (33) (I989) ("purchaser" IS "one who takes by 
purchase," wh1ch "includes tak1I1g by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, Is-
sue or re-1ssue, gift or any other voluntary transact10n creating an mterest m property"). 
2I4. Id. § 3-304(2). 
2I5. Id. § 3-304(4}{e) (which supports strong actual knowledge reqmrement of former 
section 3-304(2) by prov1ding that knowledge "that any person negotiating the mstrument 1s 
or was a fiduc1ary" 1s not enough to Impart notice of a defense to the purchaser). 
216. See td. § 3-304(2) & comment 5. 
217. See, e.g., Waukon Auto Supply v. Farmers & Merchants Sav. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 
844 (Iowa 1989); First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., 771 
P.2d 1096 (Utah App. 1989). 
218. See, e.g., J. NoRTON-KYSHE, THE DICTIONARY OF LEGAL QuoTATIONS 152 (1968) 
(quoting Ex parte Long, 3 W.R. 19 (1854) (Lord Campbell: "Hard cases, it IS said, make bad 
laws.")). 
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cial InstitutiOn attempting to Invoke former subsectiOn 3-304(2) 
protectiOn appears, at least after the fact, to have been In the best 
position to have prevented the fraud. While the former subsectiOn 
3-304(2) knowledge criteriOn apparently preempted many actiOns 
against financial mstitutwns,219 the cases In which courts have Im-
posed liability upon banks by playing somewhat fast and loose 
with former subsectiOn 3-304(2) In order to apparently accommo-
date their personal preferences are more pertinent for the purposes 
of this essay Several cases, In particular, warrant mention. 
One of the more provocative decisions construmg commercial 
paper and bank deposits law IS Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. Un~ted Cali-
fornw Bank. 220 In the course of deciding mynad Issues of concern 
to banking InstitutiOns, the California Supreme Court determined 
the liability of a depositary for handling Items that had been 
manipulated by a faithless employee (a fiduciary) embezzling 
funds of her employer (the beneficiary). The faithless employee 
had fraudulently prepared checks, payable to United California 
Bank, for her employer's signature. She deposited each of the 
checks Into her personal account at UCB.221 Despite UCB's claim 
of holder In due course status, the court cited former subsectiOn 3-
304(2) to support the decision that UCB was not a holder In due 
219. See Schwegmann Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 880 F.2d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 
1989) (mere knowledge of the poor financial condition of debtor does not constitute notice 
of defense); Lawton v. Walder, 231 Va. 247, 252-53, 343 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1986) (in action 
mvolvmg non-bank parties, fact that purchaser may have acted negligently or had notice of 
suspiCious ctrcumstances IS msuffictent to deny holder m due course status under former 
section 3-304); see also Soloff v. Dollahite, 779 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (in 
action agamst non-bank party without actual knowledge that corporate fiductary had 
breached hts duty, the form of the transaction, here corporate notes, did not affect holder m 
due course status of transferee); Favors v. Yaffe, 605 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) 
(even if a party proved that purchaser had knowledge of fact that the note was s1gned and 
returned for executory prom1se, or was accompamed by a separate agreement, unless that 
party could show that purchaser had notice of a cla1m or defense, such knowledge by pur-
chaser would not constitute notice); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 85 
Cal. App. 3d 797, 824-25, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883, 901-02 (1978) (defendant bank not put on 
notice of mqmry as to any claim or defense because of amb1guity as to party to be pa1d; 
payee line was not so Irregular as to call mto question mstrument's validity). 
220. 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978). 
221. Sun 'N Sand, 21 Cal. 3d at 678-79, 582 P.2d at 926, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 335. The 
employee, over a three year penod, drew nme checks for small amounts. Then, after ob-
tammg the authonzed s1gnatures, the employee altered the amounts on the checks, 
mcreasmg them to several thousand dollars each. She further concealed her actions by de-
stroymg some company records and altermg others. 
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course because UCB had taken With notiCe.222 The court thought 
that the bank had notice of possible wrongdomg where an em-
ployee was depositmg Into her account checks of her employer 
payable to the bank. 
The court construed the notice provisiOn of former subsectiOn 
3-304(2) In obJective terms, pursuant to subsectiOn 1-201(25)(c): 
[The facts m evidence] suggest an Irregularity m the negotiation of 
the checks whiCh at the very least creates an ambiguity as to the 
proper disbursement of the funds represented by the checks; mdeed, 
the facts present the situatiOn described m subdivision (2), which 
seems to contemplate that notice derives not from a mere ambigUity 
as to the person to be paid, but from affirmative mdicat10ns that an 
Improper party Is attemptmg to procure payment.223 
The footnote accompanymg that portwn of the opmwn was 
particularly enlightenmg; the court assumed a fundamental affimty 
between the subsectiOn 3-304(2) analysis and the viability of the 
employer's common law negligence action agamst UCB.224 In an 
elaboratiOn of that affinity, the court sidestepped the consequences 
of Its conclusiOn to some extent, but specifically equated "notice" 
under the Code to negligence liability 225 "[T]he facts which Impart 
notice herem are precisely those facts which form the basis of 
UCB's breach of duty· [I]ts negligence denves from Its failure to 
respond reasonably to the 'notice' conveyed by such suspiciOus 
cucumstances. " 226 
Other courts have recogmzed the availability of negligence 
theones that parallel the former subsectiOn 3-304(2) not1ce mqmry 
In Pargas, Inc. v. Estate of Taylor,227 a Louisiana appellate court 
expressly found that "inqmry" notice would be sufficient under 
former subsectiOn 3-304(4)(e); the plaintiff was not reqUired to es-
tablish that the bank had actual knowledge of the employee's 
222. Id. at 690, 582 P.2d at 933, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 342. 
223. /d. (citing Dayton, Pnce & Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 64 A.D.2d 563, 565, 406 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1978)). 
224. ld. at 690 n.16, 582 P.2d at 933 n.16, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 342 n.16 ("The duty of a 
bank presented with a check drawn to its order ts more fully discussed m the analysts of 
Sun 'N Sand's negligence cause of action [later m] this opmwn."). 
225. See td. at 698 n.21, 582 P.2d at 938 n.21, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 347 n.21 (the court 
effectively "writes" the subjective knowledge standard out of sectton 3-304 and replaces it 
with an objective notice standard). 
226. /d. 
227. 416 So. 2d 1358 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
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breach of fiduciary duty 228 Sufficient notice was Inferred from the 
circumstances to deny the depositary holder In due course sta-
tus.229 The court recognized that the employee fraud provisions of 
former sectiOn 3-405 were Inapplicable to the facts as presented, 230 
and then noted that under the U.F.A. the bank would have been 
absolved of liability to the employer, absent actual knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the court Imposed liability on the depositary for Its 
failure to Inqmre. The court deemed dispositive the fact that the 
defendant-bank had not only failed to act reasonably with regard 
to the checks In question, but, more Importantly, had failed to fol-
low its own Internal procedures In connection with such items. 231 
Arguably, the court's actiOn misapplied 3-304(2), since former 3-
304(2) requires actual knowledge that a fiduciary Is transferring 
the Instrument for his own benefit or otherwise In breach of fiduci-
ary duty, but the court nevertheless Imposed liability on the basis 
of an objective duty to Inquire. 
Notwithstanding the language of 3-304(2), other courts also 
have construed that provision to Impose upon the financial mstitu-
tiOn a burden to take steps to Inquire once the hint of fiduciary 
fraud IS "in the air."232 At least one court has even gone so far as to 
engraft pre-U.C.C. duties of Inquuy notice on banks that deal with 
fiduciaries. 233 
The uneasy tensiOn between subjective knowledge and objec-
tive notice standards IS illustrated by a decision applymg New 
228. Pargas, 4I6 So. 2d at 1362. 
229. Id. 
230. I d. Because the employee here was not Impersonating anyone and because former 
section 3-405 mvolves the Issuance of a negotiable mstrument mduced by an tmposter it 
would not apply to the facts m Issue. Id. (citing Annotation, Construction and Application 
of UCC § 3-405(1)(a) Involvmg Issuance of Negotiable Instrument Induced by Imposter 
92 A.L.R.3d 608 (1979)). The court reasoned that former section 3-405 was mapplicable 
smce the employee "was not Impersonating anyone" and this was "not a case of a fictitious 
payee." Pargas 4I6 So. 2d at 1362. Cunously, the court failed to note comment 4(b) to 
former section 3-405 which clearly encompasses the employee fraud presented by the facts 
at Issue - employee furmshes the name of an ex1sting payee, "but mtends h1m to have no 
mterest m the check." U.C.C. § 3-405(c) & comment 4(b) (1989). 
231. Pargas, 416 So. 2d at 1361. The court took JUdicial notice of the fact that checks 
payable to a corporation are not normally endorsed m blank with a rubber stamp and then 
delivered to a thud party. Further, the bank's mternal procedures reqmred a corporate reso-
lution authonzmg particular mdiv1duals to mdorse corporate checks. 
232. See Mott Gram Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 259 N.W.2d 667 (N.D. 1977). 
233. See Waukon Auto Supply v. Farmers & Merchants Sav. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 844 
(Iowa 1989). 
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York's non-uniform verswn of 3-304(7). Chemtcal Bank v. Has-
kell234 reversed a lower court ·squarely on this Issue of subJective 
knowledge versus reasonable mqmry notice. The New York Com-
mercial Code version of former subsectiOn 3-304(7) provided that 
for a purchaser to have the type of notice that would vitiate holder 
m due course status, "'the purchaser must have [had] knowledge 
of the claim or defense or had knowledge of such facts that his 
actwn In takmg the Instrument amounts to bad fmth.' " 235 That 
subsectiOn was added to the New York Code to make clear that 
former subsectiOn 3-304(2) mandated a subJective standard. The 
court elaborated by distingmshmg the duty Imposed by New York 
law from the duty contemplated In the lower court's opmwn: 
"[T]he mqmry IS not whether a reasonable banker m Chemical's 
positiOn would have known, or would have Inquued concermng the 
alleged breach by Stanndco of Its partnership duties, but rather, 
the Inquuy IS what Chemical Itself actually knew "236 
Observe, however, that there are situatwns other than those 
encompassed by former subsection 3-304(2) m whiCh a taker of an 
mstrument from a fiduciary might be held to have not1ce of a cla1m 
or defense that would prevent the transferee from bemg a holder 
m due course.237 Therefore, even though a bank takes an mstru-
ment and has no knowledge that the fiduciary has benefited 
personally from the transactiOn, It IS still possible that the circum-
stances are so unusual that the bank, "from all the facts and 
circumstances known to [it],"238 may have notice of a claim or de-
fense of the beneficiary In fact, the deposit of a check, payable to 
a busmess, 1nto the personal account of an employee might be JUst 
such a case. 239 
234. 51 N.Y.2d 85, 411 N.E.2d 1339, 432 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1980). 
235. Chemtcal Bank, 51 N.Y.2d at 92, 411 N.E.2d at 1341, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 481 (c1tmg 
New York vers1on of former section 3-304(7)). 
236. ld. at 92, 411 N.E.2d at 1341, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 480. 
237. See Gross v. Appelgren, 171 Colo. 7, 18, 467 P.2d 789, 794 (1970). (bank "was so 
closely connected with entire transaction" that it was precluded from asserting holder m 
due course status as defense agamst fraudulent mdorsement cause of action). 
238. Section 1-201 prov1des: "A person has 'notice' of a fact when (a) he has actual 
knowledge of it; or (b) he has rece1ved a notice or notification of it; or (c) from all the facts 
and Circumstances known to h1m at the time m question he has reason to know that it 
ex1sts." U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1989). 
239. See, e.g., McConmco v. Thud Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1973); Hunting-
don County v. First-Grange Nat'l Bank, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 418 (1959). See also mfra text 
accompanymg notes 279-316. 
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C. Rev~sed U.C.C. Art~cle 3 
A number of sectiOns of revised Article 3 affect bank liability 
for fiduciary fraud. The most Important of these new provisions 
are revised sectiOn 3-307, "Notice of Breach of Fiduciary Duty,"240 
and revised sectiOn 3-405, "Employer's Responsibility for Fraudu-
lent Indorsement by Employee. "241 Also, the change In the 
definition of "good faith" from "honesty In fact"242 to "honesty In 
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing"243 will have a substantial Impact on a bank's ability to 
achieve holder In due course status and the ·resulting protection 
from beneficiaries' fiduciary fraud claims. Several other sectiOns of 
reVIsed Article 3 have a less significant Impact on bank liability for 
fiduciary fraud. They Include revised section 3-110, "IdentificatiOn 
of Person to Whom Instrument Is Payable,"244 and revised section 
3-206, "Restnctive Indorsement."245 First, revised subsectiOns 3-
110 and 3-206 will be discussed briefly Then, revised sectiOns 3-
307, 3-404, 3-405 and 3-406 and the new "good faith" rules will be 
discussed In detail. 
1. Remsed U.C.C. Sectwn 3-110.-Revised section 3-110, en-
titled "IdentificatiOn of Person to Whom Instrument Is Payable," 
contains, In subsectiOn (c)(2), rules equivalent to those of former 
sectiOn 3-117 regarding checks payable to agents or other fiducia-
ries.246 Revised subsectiOn 3-110(c)(2)(iii) provides that "an 
240. u.c.c. § 3-307 (1990). 
241. Id. § 3-405. 
242. u.c.c. § 1-201(19) (1989). 
243. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990). 
244. Id. § 3-110. 
245. /d. § 3-206. 
246. /d. § 3-110 comment 3. Revtsed subsection 3-110(c)(2) provtdes: 
If an mstrument ts payable to: 
(i) a trust, an estate, or a person described as trustee or representative of a 
trust or estate, the mstrument ts payable to the trustee, the representative, 
or a successor of either, whether or not the benefictary or estate ts also 
named; 
(ii) a person described as agent or stmilar representative of a named or Identi-
fied person, the mstrument ts payable to the represented person, the 
representative, or a successor of the representative; 
(iii) a fund or orgamzation that ts not a legal entity, the mstrument ts payable 
to a representative of the members of the fund or orgamzation; or 
(iv) an office or to a person described as holding an office, the mstrument ts 
payable to the named person, the meum bent of the office, or a successor to 
the mcumbent. 
!d. § 3-110(c)(2). 
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mstrument payable to a fund or organizatiOn that Is not a 
legal entity IS payable to a representative of the members of 
the fund or organization. "247 In the case of Instruments payable to 
an agent of a named or Identified person, former sectiOn 3-117 
stated that the Instrument 1s payable to the prmc1pal, but that the 
agent can act as if he were the holder.248 Revised sectiOn 3-110, 
however, merely says that the mstrument Is payable to either the 
prmc1pal or the agent. 249 There seems to be no difference m legal 
effect between the two statements regarding the nghts of the 
agent. Similarly, former subsectiOn 3-110(1)(f) stated that an In-
strument payable to "an office, or an officer by h1s title as such 
IS payable to the pnncipal but the mcumbent of the office may 
act as If he were the holder,"2150 while revised subsectiOn 3-
110(c)(2)(iv) says that In such a case "the mstrument 1s payable to 
the named person, the Incumbent of the office, or a successor to 
the mcumbent."261 As to this case, under former subsectiOn 3-
110(1)(f), a check payable to "Sm1th, County Treasurer" probably 
could not be negotiated by Smith after he left office, 2152 while re-
vised subsectiOn 3-110(c)(2)(iv), smce 1t makes the check payable 
to Smith, possibly gives Smith power to transfer even after he has 
left office.263 The change will only affect transferees who take In-
struments from wrongdOing former office holders that managed to 
gain possessiOn of checks payable to them as officers, and m that 
247. Id. § 3-110(c)(2)(iii). Former subsection 3-llO(l)(g) stated stmilarly that an m-
strument payable to "a partnership or unmcorporated assoc1ation 1s payable to the 
partnership or association and may be mdorsed or transferred by any person thereto author-
Ized." U.C.C. § 3-110(1)(g) (1989). The change m statement of the rule probably does not 
change the substance of the rule; under either formulatwn representatives have power to 
transfer or collect the mstrument. 
248. U.C.C. § 3-117(a) (1989). 
249. Compare U.C.C. § 3-110(c)(2) (1990} ("If an mstrument 1s payable to a person 
described as agent or s1milar representative of a named or Identified person, the mstrument 
1s payable to the represented person, the representative, or a successor of the representative 
")with U.C.C. § 3-117(a) (1989) ("An mstrument made payable to a named person With 
the addition of words describmg h1m as agent or officer of a specified person 1s payable 
to h1s prmc1pal but the agent or officer may act as if he were the holder " (emphasis 
added)). 
250. U.C.C. § 3-llO(l)(f) (1989). 
251. U.C.C. § 3-110(c)(2)(iv) (1990). 
252. U.C.C. § 3-llO(l)(f) (1989) ("[The mstrument}1s payable to the prmcipal but the 
mcumbent of the office or hts successors may act as if he or they were the holder. "). 
253. U.C.C. § 3-110(c)(2)(iv) (1990) (the mstrument on the facts stated IS "payable to 
the named person, the mcumbent of the office, or a successor to the mcumbent."). 
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case arguably protects transferees who would otherwise take under 
a forged Indorsement.254 Nevertheless, the only probable taker of 
such an Instrument will be a depositary bank and, under revised 
sectiOn 3-307, a bank that accepts such an Instrument for any pur-
pose other than as a deposit to the account of the beneficiary Is 
likely to be liable to the beneficiary if the former office holder em-
bezzles the funds. 255 
2. RevLsed U.C.C. Sectwn 3-206.-Revised sectiOn 3-206256 
replaces former sectiOns 3-205257 and 3-206258 and contmues the 
rules of those sectiOns as they relate to the responsibilities of 
254. If a former office holder IS no longer a person to whom an mstrument IS payable, 
then presumably hts mdorsement of the mstrument ts a forgery. 
255. See mfra notes 279-316 and accompanymg text. 
256. Revtsed section 3-206 reads as follows: 
Restnctive Indorsement. 
(a) An mdorsement limiting payment to a particular person or otherwtse prohib-
iting further transfer or negotiation of the mstrument 1s not effective to prevent 
further transfer or negotiation of the mstrument. 
(b) An mdorsement stating a condition to.the rtght of the mdorsee to receive 
payment does not affect the right of the mdorsee to enforce the mstrument. A person 
paymg the mstrument or takmg it for value or collection may disregard the condition, 
and the r1ghts and liabilities of that person are not affected by whether the condition 
has been fulfilled. 
(c) If an mstrument bears an mdorsement (i) described m Section 4-201(b), or 
(ii) m blank or to a particular bank usmg the words "for deposit," "for collection," or 
other words mdicating a purpo~e of havmg the Instrument collected by a bank for the 
mdorser or for a particular account, the followmg rules apply: 
(1) A person, other than a bank, who purchases the mstrument when so 
mdorsed converts the mstrument unless the amount pa1d for the mstrument IS 
received by the mdorser or applied consistently with the mdorsement. 
(2) A depositary bank that purchases the mstrument or that takes it for 
collection when so mdorsed converts the mstrument unless the amount p'atd by 
the bank with respect to the mstrument IS received by the mdorser or applied 
consistently with the mdorsement. 
(3) A payor bank that IS also the depositary bank or that takes the mstru-
ment for Immediate payment over the counter from a person other than a 
collecting bank converts the mstrument unless the proceeds of the mstrument 
are received by the mdorser or applied consistently with the mdorsement. 
(4) Except as otherwise provided m paragraph (3), a payor bank or mter-
mediary bank may disregard the mdorsement and IS not liable if the proceeds 
of the mstrument are not rece1ved by the mdorser or applied consistently with 
the mdorsement. 
(d) Except for an mdorsement covered by subsection (c), if an mstrument bears 
an mdorsement usmg words to the effect that payment IS to be made to the mdorsee 
as agent, trustee, or other fiduciary for the benefit of the mdorser or another person 
the followmg rules apply: 
(1) Unless there IS notice of breach of fiduciary duty as provided m subsec-
tion 3-307, a person who purchases the mstrument from the mdorsee or takes 
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banks dealing With fiducianes.269 Revised subsectiOn 3-206(c)280 
continues the old rule that a depositary bank Is liable for conver-
sion If It accepts an Instrument mdorsed "for deposit" or "for 
collectiOn," and the amount paid by the bank for the check IS 
neither received by the mdorser nor applied consistently With the 
mdorsement. Therefore, as was the case under former sect10ns 3-
205 and 3-206, a depositary bank will be liable If It permits a 
check, payable to an employer and Indorsed "for deposit" or "for 
collectiOn" by the employer, to be deposited In the account of, or 
cashed by, an embezzling employee.281 
Revised subsection 3-206(d) provides that if an mdorsement 
mdicates that payment Is to be made to the Indorsee as a fiduciary 
for the benefit of another person, a transferee for value or for col-
lectiOn may pay the fiduciary-Indorsee Without liability to the 
beneficiary, unless there IS notice of a breach of fiduciary duty 
under rev1sed sect10n 3-307 282 The sect10n, therefore, permits pay-
ment of cash to the In-trust Indorsee, unless there IS notice of 
breach of the fiduciary's duty Under revised sect10n 3-307, there 
the mstrument from the mdorsee for collection or payment may pay the pro-
ceeds of payment or the value gtven for the mstrument to the mdorsee without 
regard to whether the mdorsee violates a fiduciary duty to the mdorser. 
(2) A subsequent transferee of the mstrument or person who pays the In-
strument 1s neither given notice nor otherwise affected by the restnction m the 
mdorsement unless the transferee or payor knows that the fiduciary dealt with 
the mstrument or its proceeds m breach of fiduciary duty. 
(e) The presence on an mstrument of an mdorsement to wh1ch this sectiOn ap-
plies does not prevent a purchaser of the mstrument from becommg a holder m due 
course of the mstrument unless the purchaser 1s a converter under subsectiOn (c) or 
has notice or knowledge of breach of fiduciary duty as stated m subsection (d). 
(f) In an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the mstrument, the 
obligor has a defense if payment would VIolate an mdorsement to which this section 
applies and the payment IS not permitted by this section. 
u.c.c. § 3-206 (1990). 
257. u.c.c. § 3-205 (1989). 
258. !d. § 3-206. 
259. U.C.C. § 3-206 comments 1 & 3 (1990). One of the major contributiOns of revised 
Article 3 1s the clear restatement, contamed m revised section 3-206, of the rules applicable 
to "for deposit" or "for collection" and trust mdorsements. It was nearly Impossible for the 
ummt1ated to glean the meamng of former section 3-206 from the language. See td. § 3-206 
comments 3 & 4. 
260. Id. § 3-206(c). 
261. Id. § 3-206(c)(2) & (3); see also B. CLARK, THE LAw OF BANK DEPOSITS. CoLLEC 
TIONS, AND CREDIT CARDS 4-30 to 4-35 (rev. ed. 1981). 
262. See U.C.C. § 3-206(d)(l) (1990). See also supra notes 2I3-16 and accompanymg 
text. 
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would be notice of breach of fiduciary duty if the transferee of the 
Instrument knew that the Indorsee Intended to use the funds for 
her own benefit.263 Similarly, revised subsectiOn 3-206(d) might 
seem to permit deposit to the account of the Indorsee-fiduciary 
since it would seem that payment to the fiduciary might be made 
either In cash or by credit to her account; however, revised section 
3-307264 provides that a bank has notice of a breach of fiduciary 
duty if a fiduciary deposits a check, Indorsed to the fiduciary as 
such, Into the personal account of the fiduciary 265 
In-trust Indorsements are not likely to be common and, there-
fore, any Inconsistency between the liability of a transferee that 
pays cash to the In-trust Indorsee and a bank that allows the In-
trust Indorsee to deposit the check Into her personal account Is not 
likely to be of great consequence. The fact that the transferee can 
pay cash to the In-trust Indorsee under revised subsectiOn 3-
206(c)(1) Is likely to have greater Importance In relatiOn to the 
question of whether, under revised sectiOn 3-307, a bank can pay 
cash to a fiduciary In cases In which a check Is drawn payable to 
the fiduciary In trust, rather than Indorsed In trust. 266 
3. Remsed U.C.C. Sectwn 3-307 -Revised sectiOn 3-307267 Is 
an elaborate statement of the circumstances under whiCh a taker 
from a fiduciary Is deemed "on notice" and: therefore, subJect to 
263. See U.C.C. § 3-307(b)(2) (I990). See also mfra note 323. 
264. U.C.C. § 3-307 (1990). See mfra notes 270-320 and accompanymg text. 
265. U.C.C. § 3-307(b)(2) (1990) ("In the case of an mstrument payable to the 
fiduciary as such, the taker has notice of the breach of fiduciary duty if the mstrument 1s 
(iii) deposited to an account other than an account of the fiduciary as such, or an account of 
the represented person."). No case has been found mvolvmg an "in trust" mdorsement and 
deposit mto a fiduciary's personal account under former Article 3. 
266. If the check as drawn IS payable to "A, trustee for B," no trust mdorsement 1s 
mvolved and, therefore, revised subsection 3-206(c)(1), by its terms, does not apply. How-
ever, it would seem mcons1stent to apply a different rule of transferee liability m that case. 
See U.C.C. § 3-206(c)(1) (1990). See also supra notes 112-23 and accompanymg text. 
267. Revised section 3-307 provides as follows: 
Notice of Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 
(a) In th1s section: 
(1) "Fiduciary" means an agent, trustee, partner, corporate officer or di-
rector, or other representative owmg a fiduciary duty with respect to an 
mstrument. 
(2) "Represented person" means the prmcipal, beneficiary, partnership, 
corporation, or other person to whom the duty stated m paragraph (1) 1s owed. 
(b) If (i) an mstrument 1s taken from a fiduciary for payment or collection or for 
value, (ii) the taker has knowledge of the fiductary status of the fiduciary, and (iii) 
the represented person makes a cla1m to the mstrument or its proceeds on the bas1s 
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claims of a beneficiary that her fiduciary has misappropriated 
funds. The section, to a large extent, IS based upon the provisiOns 
of the Umform Fiduciaries Act that have been prevwusly dis-
cussed. 268 Former Article 3 dealt with the Issue of notice to persons 
dealing wtth fiduciaries only superficially In former sectiOn 
3-304.269 
Revised sectiOn 3-307 applies If (1) an Instrument 1s taken 
from a fiduciary for payment or collectiOn, or for value, (2) the 
taker has knowledge of the fiduciary status of the fiduciary, and (3) 
the beneficiary makes a clmm against the transferee for the Instru-
ment or Its proceeds on the ground that her fiduciary breached his 
duty 270 In those circumstances, if the taker has notice of a possible 
breach of fiduciary duty, the taker becomes liable to the benefi-
Ciary 1f there IS In fact a misappropnatwn of the proceeds of the 
mstrument. 271 
that the transaction of the fiduc1ary 1s a breach of fiduc1ary duty, the followmg rules 
apply: 
(1) Notice of breach of fiducmry duty by the fiduc1ary IS notice of the 
cla1m of the represented person. 
(2) In the case of an mstrument payable to the represented person or the 
fiduc1ary as such, the taker has notice of the breach of fiduc1ary duty if the 
mstrument IS (i) taken m payment of or as security for a debt known by the 
taker to be the personal debt of the fiduciary, (ii) taken m a transaction known 
by the taker to be for the personal benefit of the fiduc1ary, or (iii) deposited to 
an account other than an account of the fiduc1ary, as such, or an account of the 
represented person. 
(3) If an mstrument 1s 1ssued by the represented person or the fiduc1ary as 
such, and made payable to the fiduc1ary personally, the taker does not have 
notice of the breach of fiduciary duty unless the taker knows of the breach of 
fiduc1ary duty. 
(4) If an mstrument IS Issued by the represented person or the fiduciary as 
such, to the taker as payee, the taker has notice of the breach of fiduciary duty 
if the mstrument Is (i) taken m payment of or as security for a debt known by 
the taker to be the personal debt of the fiduc1ary, {ii) taken m a transaction 
known by the taker to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, or (iii) de-
posited to an account other than an account of the fiduc1ary, as such, or an 
account of the represented person. 
u.c.c. § 3-307 (1990). 
268. See td. § 3-307 comments 3 (rev1sed subsection 3-307(b)(2) tracks U.F.A. sect1on 
4) & 4 (rev1sed subsection 3-307(b)(3) tracks U.F.A. section 6). See the discussion of the 
U.F.A. supra notes 54-85 and accompanymg text. 
269. See U.C.C. § 3-304 (1989); see also supra notes 211-39 and accompanymg text. 
270. u.c.c. § 3-307(b) (1990). 
271. /d. § 3-307(b)(1). In that case, a transferee for value could not be a holder m due 
course smce it has notice of the claim of the beneficiary. !d. §§ 3-302(a)(2) & 3-306. Such 
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Mirrormg sections 4 and 5 of the U.F.A.,272 revised sectiOn 3-
307 Imposes liability for any fraud of the fiduciary on the taker of 
the Instrument if it (1) knowing that it Is dealing with a fiduciary, 
(2) takes an Instrument payable to the beneficiary or to the fiduci-
ary as such, or an Instrument drawn by the beneficiary or by the 
fiduciary, and (3) accepts the Instrument: (a) In payment of or as 
security for a debt known by the taker to be the personal debt of 
the fiduciary, or (b) In any transactiOn known by the taker to be 
for the personal benefit of the fiduciary 273 Also, like the U.F.A.,274 
revised sectiOn 3-307 provides that a transferee may take an In-
strument drawn by the fiduciary as such or by the beneficiary and 
payable to the fiduciary personally, without being put on notice of 
a breach of fiduciary duty 276 
Under U.F.A. sectiOns 4 and 5, a transferee or drawee Is also 
liable to the beneficiary if it takes from the fiduciary with knowl-
edge of such facts that its taking amounts to bad faith.276 Revised 
sectiOn 3-307 does not state the bad faith rule, but as to transfer-
ees for value or for collectwn the general holder In due course 
rules of revised section 3-302 will produce the same result.277 Also, 
a drawee who m bad faith pays the Instrument~to the fiduciary will 
be guilty of conversiOn. 278 
a. Credr,t of Check to Fiducr,ary's Personal Ac-
count.-Revised sectiOn 3-307 makes one maJor change from the 
rules under the U.F.A. Under the U.F.A., a bank can permit a fidu-
ciary to deposit fiduciary funds to the personal account of the 
fiduciary and then allow the fiduciary to withdraw the funds with-
out Incurring liability to the beneficiary, unless the transferee IS 
transferee would then be liable m conversion if it had already received the mstruments, 
unless the bank IS entitled to the "good faith" defense. Id. § 3-420(c). 
If a bank pays, or takes for collection, with notice of a claim of the beneficiary, it IS 
subject to the clatm of the beneficiary under revised section 3-306 and, presumably, IS liable 
m conversmn if it has already pmd to the wrongdomg fiduciary. See ld. § 3-420(a) ("The law 
applicable to conversion of personal property applies to mstruments."). 
272. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanymg text. 
273. u.c.c. § 3-307(b)(4) (1990). 
274. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES Ac:r § 6, 7A U.L.A. 410 (1985). 
275. u.c.c. § 3-307(b)(3) (1990). 
276. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanymg text. 
277. Compare U.C.C. § 3-307 (1990) with ld. §§ 3-302 & 3-420(c). 
278. See supra note 271. 
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acting In bad faith.279 However, under revised sectiOn 3-307, a de-
positary IS on notice of breach of fiduciary duty if the depositary 
allows the fiduciary to deposit to an account other than one for the 
benefit of the beneficiary· (a) an mstrument payable to the benefi-
ciary or the fiduciary as such, or (b) an Instrument drawn by the 
beneficiary or the fiduciary and payable to the depositary 280 There 
IS, therefore, automatic liability if a bank allows a fiduciary to de-
posit Items of the types JUSt described In the fiduciary's personal 
account and the fiduciary then uses the funds for non-fiduciary 
purposes. 281 
The U .F .A. rule 1s based upon the assumptiOn that a fiduciary 
will properly apply fiduciary funds and that knowledge by a depos-
Itary bank that a fiduciary has deposited fiduciary funds In her 
personal checking account IS not knowledge or notice of a present 
or Intended future misappropnatwn. On the other hand, revised 
Article 3 treats a deposit by a fiduciary In her personal account as, 
m effect, a suspiciOus cucumstance Imposing on the depositary 
bank the nsk that the deposit IS part of a scheme to misappropn-
ate funds.282 
While revised sectiOn 3-307 departs from the U.F.A. regarding 
the liability of banks that accept deposits from fiduc1anes for the 
personal account of the fiduc1ary,283 the rev1sed Article 3 prov1s1ons 
are consistent w1th many, but not all, recent cases.284 The com-
ments to revised sectiOn 3-307 accurately state that the matter IS 
one on which the courts.are div1ded.285 Nearly all the recent cases 
279. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT§ 9, 7A U.L.A. 417 (1985). Section 9 provides that a bank 
1s not liable to the beneficiary for allowmg a fiduciary to deposit fiduciary funds (either 
checks payable to the beneficiary or fiduciary or drawn by the fiduciary) mto the fiduciary's 
personal account, nor IS it liable for allowmg the fiduciary to subsequently withdraw such 
funds, unless it has knowledge of the misappropnation or knows such facts that its allow-
ance of the withdrawal IS bad faith. Section 9 does not specifically refer to checks made 
payable to the depositary bank, but its language 1s sufficiently broad to cover checks paya-
ble to the beneficiary, to the fiduciary, and to the bank. See Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Zions 
First Nat'l Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968). 
280. See U.C.C. § 3-307(b) (1990). 
281. Jd. § 3-307(b)(2) & (4). 
282. /d. § 3-307 comment 3 ("[l)t ts not normal for an mstrument payable to the 
fiduciary, as such, to be used for the personal benefit of the fiductary."). 
283. Jd. 
284. See mfra notes 292-312 and accompanymg text. 
285. U.C.C. § 3-307 comment 3 (1990) ("there ts a split of authority"). 
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1nvolve disloyal employees rather than trustees of trusts or 
estates. 286 
A common form of employee misconduct Involves takmg a 
check payable to the employer, placing the Indorsement of the em-
ployer thereon, and depositmg the check In the employee's 
personal account. Under former Article 3, if the employee has no 
real or apparent authority to Indorse the check, the Indorsement IS 
a forgery 287 Subject to the possible limitatiOn Imposed by former 
subsectiOn 3-419(3),288 and to possible liability of the employer 
under former sectiOn 3-406,289 the bank that takes the check from 
the employee Is liable In conversiOn to the employer for Interfering 
with the employer's rights In the check. 290 On the other hand, if 
the employee had authority to Indorse the check, no forgery IS In-
volved and the depositary bank will take free of the claim of the 
employer if the bank Is a holder In due course. 291 
286. See zd. § 3-404 comment 3. 
287. See U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(b) ("a person s1gnmg as or on behalf of a maker or drawer" 
will prov1de the transferee with an effective mdorsement) & comment 3 (1989). 
288. Under former subsection 3-419(3), a representative, mcluding a depositary bank 
who dealt m good faith with an item on behalf of a person who was not the true owner, 
would not be liable to the true owner beyond the amount of the proceeds of the item still m 
the hands of the representative when it learned of the true owner's mterest. See U.C.C. § 3-
419(3) (1989). However, smce, m the case posited, the depositary bank would be liable to 
subsequent parties, mcluding the payee bank, for breach of the warranty of title, many 
courts have refused to g1ve effect to former section 3-419(3), and have mstead held that 
depositary banks may be liable to the true owners even though the banks permitted com-
plete withdrawal of all the account funds by wrongdoers. See J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, 
UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 668 (3d ed. 1988). Rev1sed Article 3 does not prov1de the pro-
tection that former subsection 3-419(3) furmshed depositary banks. See U.C.C. § 3-420(c) 
(1990) ("A representative, other than a depositary bank, that has m good faith dealt with 
an mstrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the person entitled to enforce 
the mstrument IS not liable m conversiOn to that person beyond the amount of any proceeds 
that it has not pa1d out." (emphasiS added)). 
289. Under former section 3-406, a person whose negligence substantially contributed 
to the makmg of an unauthorized s1gnature was precluded from asserting the forgery agamst 
a holder m due course or a drawee or other payor who had paid the mstrument m good faith 
and m accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's bust-
ness. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989). An employer that was itself negligent, as m failing to discover 
that an employee had been previously guilty of embezzlement, would be barred from assert-
mg the forgery. See Commerctal Credit Eqmp. Corp. v. First Ala. Bank, 636 F.2d 1051 (5th 
Cir. Unit B 1981) (where the employee was a known embezzler). 
290. As to payor banks, see U.C.C. § 3-419(l)(c) (1989) ("An mstrument IS converted 
when it 1s patd on a forged mdorsement."); see also B. CLARK, THE LAw OF BANK DEPOS-
ITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS § 8.04[5](b) (3d ed. 1990). 
291. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302 (defimng holder m due course) & 3-403 (1990) (unauthonzed 
Signatures). 
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In recent years, however, courts have generally found that 
banks were not holders m due course when they accepted for de-
posit Into an employee's personal account checks payable to an 
employer.292 In spite of the fact that the official comment to former 
subsectiOn 3-304(2) stated that "the purchaser may pay cash Into 
the hands of the fiduciary without notice of any breach of the obli-
gation [of the fiduciary to the beneficiary],"293 several courts have 
held that depositing the check mto the account of the employee 
was a transactiOn for the benefit of the employee-fiduciary under 
former subsectiOn 3-304(2); therefore, the depositary bank had no-
tice of the claim of the employer.294 One court even went so far as 
to allow the trustee In bankruptcy to recover agamst a bank that 
allowed the sole owner-president of the corporatiOn to deposit Into 
hts personal account, or take cash for, checks payable to the 
corporat10n.295 
292. See, e.g., m{ra notes 294-95. 
293. U.C.C. § 3-304 comment 5 (1989}; see also td. § 3-304(2} ("The purchaser has 
notice of a clatm agamst the mstrument when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negoti-
ated the mstrument m payment of or as security for h1s own debt or m any transaction for 
h1s own benefit or otherwise m breach of duty."). 
294. See, e.g., Waukon Auto Supply v. Farmers & Merchants Sav. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 
844 (Iowa 1989}; Mott Gram Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 259 N.W.2d 667 (N.D. 1977); 
Pargas, Inc. v. Estate of Taylor, 416 So. 2d 1358 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Von Gohren v. Pacific 
Nat'l Bank, 8 Wash. App. 245, 505 P.2d 467 (1973). In Mott, the court also found that the 
mdorsement was a forgery smce the wrongdoer only had authority to mdorse for deposit 
mto the account of the company, even though the wrongdoer did have authority to draw 
checks on the account. Mott, 259 N.W.2d at 669-70. In Pargas, the court held that an em-
ployee who has authonty to mdorse checks only for deposit to the account of h1s employer 
commits forgery when the employee mdorses and deposits m h1s personal account. Pargas, 
416 So. 2d at 1363. 
295. See Maley v. East Side Bank, 361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1966). In Maley, the bank 
was held liable when it permitted the sole shareholder to cash or rece1ve credit for proceeds 
of mstruments payable to h1s corporation. Shortly after the shareholder acquued the corpo-
ration, the bank rece1ved about 100 credit mqumes about the corporation, and a prospective 
seller to the corporation, from outs1de the geographic area, called the bank to ask why the 
corporation m1ght be buymg out of its trade area. At the close of the conversatiOn, the 
prospective seller stated h1s belief that somethmg fishy was happemng, and that he would 
not be selling to the corporation. Nevertheless, the bank continued to allow the pres1dent to 
rece1ve cash or credit to h1s personal account for checks payable to the corporation. The 
owner-president defrauded many sellers by purchasmg on credit, selling the purchased mer-
chandise for cash, m1sappropnating the sales proceeds, and leavmg credit sellers unpaid. In 
addition to noting the negligence of the bank, the court also relied on the fact that the only 
corporate resolution on file with the bank reqmred cos1gnatures for withdrawals from the 
corporate account, although m fact, the other cOSignatory no longer had any mterest m the 
corporation, and the pres1dent could have, at any time, mstructed the bank to accept h1s 
s1gnature alone. 
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In states, however, that have adopted section 9 of the U.F.A., 
the courts should hold that, unless a bank IS guilty of bad faith or 
has knowledge of a misappropriatiOn, a bank does not become lia-
ble to the beneficiary merely by allowing the fiduciary to deposit a 
check payable to the principal or the fiduciary as such Into the 
personal account of the fiduciary 296 A case so holding IS Johnson 
v. Citz.zens Natz.onal Bank,297 decided by the IllinOis Court of Ap-
peals In 1975. 
Many fiduciaries are not employees. As to nonemployee fiduci-
aries, two recent cases took opposing positiOns concerning the 
question whether a bank that accepts a check payable to the fidu-
ciary as such for deposit Into the fiduciary's personal account Is 
liable if the fiduciary subsequently misappropriates the funds. The 
first Involved a father who deposited In his personal account a 
check payable to him as trustee for his minor son. The New York 
Court of Appeals held the depositary not liable.298 In contrast, the 
Washington Supreme Court held In a case Involving a father-
guardian who deposited guardianship funds In his personal account 
that the bank was liable.299 In the New York case, the court said 
that there Is no requirement that a check payable -to a fiduciary be 
deposited to a fiduciary account and that, In general, a bank may 
assume that a person acting as fiduciary will apply trust funds for 
trust purposes. 300 In the W ashmgton decisiOn, the court followed 
an earlier Washington case Involving an embezzling employee and 
held that a bank that allowed a check payable to a father as guard-
Ian of his minor son to be deposited to the father's personal 
account was on notice that the father was breaching his fiduciary 
duty 301 
Another common situatiOn In the reported cases IS that of a 
bank which takes a check payable to the bank from a person other 
than the drawer, and credits the check to the account of the person 
presentmg the check or otherwise allows the presenter to control 
the disposition of the proceeds of the check. The presenter may or 
may not be an employee of the drawer and may or may not be a 
296. See UNIF. FIDUCIARIES A~ § 9, 7A U.L.A. 417 (1985). 
297. 30 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 334 N.E.2d 295 (1975). 
298. In re Knox, 64 N.Y.2d 434, 477 N.E.2d 448, 64 N.Y.2d 434 (1985). 
299. Smith v. Olymp1c Bank, 103 Wash. 2d 418, 693 P.2d 92 (1985). 
300. In re Knox, 64 N.Y.2d at 436, 477 N.E.2d at 449, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 148. 
301. Smith, 103 Wash. 2d at 420, 693 P.2d at 94. 
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fiduciary of the drawer. Here, too, the cases have split, some Im-
posing liability If the presenter IS acting mconsistently with the 
Intent of the drawer302 and others holding that a bank can be a 
holder In due course of a check so deposited if It takes m good 
faith and without notice of claims or defenses. 303 (As a holder In 
due course the bank takes free of the claim by the beneficiary that 
the fiduciary wrongfully deposited the check.304) Of course, It Is Im-
plicit m the second line of cases that the mere fact that a check IS 
payable to the bank and presented by one other than the drawer Is 
not sufficient to put the bank on notice of a claim or defense of the 
drawer. The decisions usually make that pomt expressly 305 
Most of the cases that Impose liability on a bank if the pre-
senter of the check had no authority from the drawer to negotiate 
the check do not focus upon whether the presenter was an em-
ployee or fiduciary of the drawer. Rather, the result IS based on a 
categoncal rule that a bank which takes a check payable to the 
bank, Itself, from one other than the drawer IS bound to apply the 
check according to the Wishes of the drawer. For example, m 
Douglass v. Wones,306 the court first noted that pnor IllinOis cases 
had held that the payee of a check, who took the Item m payment 
of the debt of a presenter other than the drawer, could be a holder 
m due course. Therefore, the payee could take free of a claim by 
the drawer that the presenter had misappropriated the check. 307 
302. See, e.g., Bank of S. Md. v. Robertson's Crab House, 39 Md. App. 707, 389 A.2d 
388 (1978). In Robertson's Crab House, the bank was held liable for applymg proceeds of 
the corporation's checks to an employee's account without usmg ordinary care to establish 
the employee's authonzation. The court held that the bank was negligent as a matter of law 
where the bookkeeper of plamtiff Robertson deposited checks mto the tax escrow account of 
plamtiff at defendant bank, but also deposited portions of some of these checks, and all of 
others, mto his own account or the tax accounts of other busmess for which he was also 
bookkeeper. See also PWA Farms v. North Platte State Bank, 220 Neb. 516, 37I N.W.2d 
102 (I985); Douglass v. Wones, 120 Ill. App. 3d 36, 458 N.E.2d 514 (1983). See generally 
Spaulding & Sherwood, The Wayward -Corporate Check: Nottce of Diuerswn under the 
U.C.C., 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 127, 145-47 (1968). 
303. See, e.g., G.D.F Enters. v. Nye, 37 Oh10 St. 3d 205, 525 N.E.2d 10 (1988); St. 
Stephen's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Seaway Nat'l Bank, 38 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 350 
N.E.2d I28 (1976); Richardson Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 504 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1974). 
304. u.c.c. 3-305 (1989). 
305. See, e.g., St. Stephen's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Seaway Nat'l Bank, 38 Ill. 
App. 3d 1021, 350 N.E.2d 128 (1976); Richardson Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 812 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
306. 120 Ill. App. 3d 36, 458 N.E.2d 514 (1983). 
307. Douglass, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 45, 458 N.E.2d at 522. 
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Douglass then held that a different rule applies to a bank. 308 The 
Douglass court reasoned that: 
"[W]hen [a bank] Is named as the payee of a check by a party not 
mdebted to the bank, such bank will be presumed to have accepted 
the same subJect to the directions of the drawer, and not to the di-
rectiOns of a stranger to the paper who happens to present it. "309 
Other courts have expressed the same Idea by saymg that a 
bank cannot treat a check payable to itself as a bearer Instrument; 
that Is, the bank cannot assume that the person presenting the 
Item Is the owner or Is authorized to control dispositiOn of the 
item. 310 As noted above, the rule, as stated In Douglass and similar 
cases, Is not limited to fiduciaries.311 In fact, In the case of fiducia-
ries, if the particular state has adopted the U.F.A., a different 
result Is mandated if the fiduciary deposits, Into the fiduciary's 
personal account, a check drawn by the beneficiary and payable to 
the bank. 312 
As the discussiOn JUSt concluded shows, there IS substantial 
authority for the positiOn taken In revised sectiOn 3-307 that a de7 
positary bank that accepts for deposit Into the personal account of 
the fiduciary a check payable to the beneficiary or the fiduciary as 
such, or a check drawn by the beneficiary or the fiduciary as such 
and payable to the bank, Is liable to the beneficiary if the fiduciary 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 46, 458 N.E.2d at 522 (quoting Milano v. Sheridan Trust & Sav. Bank, 242 
Ill. App. 362, 369 (1926)). See mfra notes 352-62 and accompanymg text. See also, e.g., 
Bank of S. Md. v. Robertson's Crab House, 39 Md. App. 707, 714-16, 389 A.2d 388, 393-94 
(1978) (stating a Similar rule). See generally 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 183 
(1983); 9 C.J.S., Banks & Bankmg § 340 (1938). 
310. See, e.g., Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 
935-36, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 344-45 (1978). 
311. See mfra notes 301-09 and accompanymg text. 
312. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES A~ § 9, 7A U.L.A. 417 (1985) (dealing generally with checks 
drawn by the fiduciary, checks payable to the fiduciary as such, and checks payable to the 
benefictary and mdorsed by the fiduciary). Section 9 contams a catch-·all provlSlon that cov-
ers deposit of checks payable to the bank, viz: "or otherwise makes a deposit of funds held 
by h1m as fiductary." Id. In the described cases, the bank may accept the deposit mto the 
personal account of the fiductary and pay the funds out on the personal check of the fiduci-
ary without bemg liable to the beneficiary unless the bank pays with actual knowledge of 
fiduciary wrongdomg or acts m bad faith. See also UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT§ 8, 7A U.L.A. 415 
(1985) (check drawn by the fiduciary and payable to the depositary bank); see generally 
supra notes 48-52 & 77-79 and accompanymg text. Illinois has adopted the U.F.A., but the 
court m Douglass did not refer to it. 
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m fact subsequently misappropriates the funds.313 Cases so holding 
Ignore the holder In due course rules of former Article 3, adopting 
mstead a rule that automatically Imposes upon the bank the risk 
that the depositor Is acting Inconsistently with the rights of the 
drawer or owner of the check. 
In summary, the cases are split with regard to a depository 
bank's duty to make mqmnes of the beneficiary when a fiduciary 
deposits a fiduciary check Into the fiduciary's personal account. 
Some cases Impose liability on the bank If the fiduciary IS actmg 
mconsistently with the beneficiary's nghts. (The courts m those 
cases reach that result whether or not the depositor IS a fiduciary, 
and therefore extend bank liability beyond the fiduciary disloyalty 
covered m revised sectiOn 3-307). 314 Other cases have applied for 
mer Article 3 holder In due course rules and concluded that a bank 
may be a holder In due course of fiduciary checks credited by the 
bank to the personal account of the fiduciary 31~ Further, m the 
large number of states that have adopted the U.F.A., a bank IS pro-
tected m such situatwns unless the bank either had actual 
knowledge of a fiduciary-presenter's wrongdomg or acted m bad 
faith. 316 
b. PayLng Cash to a Fiducwry -Interestmgly, neither re-
vised sectwn 3-307 nor the comments thereto address the questwn 
of potential liability for paying cash to a fiduciary for fiduciary m-
struments. 317 Since under revised 3-307, fiduciary mstruments 
drawn and payable as JUSt described cannot be deposited Into the 
personal account of the fiduciary without liability to the prmcipal 
for any fiduciary wrongdomg, by analogy It seems logical that a 
similar rule should be applied where the fiduciary receives cash for 
such mstruments. Therefore, m the absence of a clear statement to 
the contrary In the statute (or the comments), a court could prop-
313. U.C.C. § 3-307 (1990); see supra notes 284-3I2 and accompanymg text. 
314. U.C.C. § 3-307 (1990); see supra notes 292-95,299 & 302 and accompanymg text. 
315. See supra note 303 and accompanymg text. 
316. See supra note 302 and accompanymg text. 
317. See U.C.C. § 3-307 (1990); cf. UNIF. FIDUCIARIES AcT § 2, 7A U.L.A. 401 (I985) 
(stating that the transferee IS not obligated to see that the fiduciary properly applies the 
proceeds of any money pa1d to the fiduciary for the prmc1pal). In the context of a transferee 
of a negotiable note, the result IS that the transferee may pay cash to the fiduciary without 
mcurrmg liability, unless there IS actual knowledge of an mtention to m1sappropnate or 
knowledge of such facts that g1vmg the cash to the fiduciary 1s bad faith. See UNIF. FIDUCIA-
RIES AcT § 9, 7A U.F.A. 417 (1985); see also supra note 305 and accompanymg text. 
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erly conclude that paying cash to the fiduciary Is a transaction for 
the personal benefit of the fiduciary, if there IS In fact a misappro-
priatiOn, thereby making the bank liable.318 However, as noted 
earlier, reVIsed sect10n 3-206 specifically provides that, In the case 
of an In-trust £ndorsement, the transferee bank can "pay the pro-
ceeds of payment or the value given for the Instrument to the 
Indorsee without regard to whether the Indorsee violates a fiduci-
ary duty to the Indorser,"319 unless the transferee has notice of a 
breach of fiduciary outy by the Indorsee. 320 
Therefore, it seems that, under revised sect10n 3-206,321 receipt 
of cash by the fiduciary-Indorsee IS not automatiCally notice of 
breach of fiduciary duty that would make the transferee bank lia-
ble under revised sect10n 3-307 322 But, if the bank Is not liable for 
paying cash to Jones where payee Smith £ndorses "Jones as trustee 
for Smith," it IS difficult to JUStify Imposing liability on the bank 
for paymg cash to Jones In the case where Smith or third party 
Roe draws the check payable to "Jones, trustee for Smith."323 
Therefore, It would seem that, by analogy from the rule of 3-206, 
the bank should be able to pay cash to Jones where the check Is 
payable to "Jones, trustee for Smith." 
However, since revised 3-206 does not apply to payees and 
since under revised 3-307 a depositary bank would be on notice of 
a breach of fiduciary duty if it allowed Jones to deposit a check 
payable to "Jones as trustee for Smith" to his personal account, 
the analogical extension of 3-307 to the case In whiCh bank pays 
cash to Jones would Impose liability on the bank. Sect10ns 3-206 
3I8. See Waukon Auto Supply v. Farmers & Merchants Sav. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 844 
(Iowa 1989) (court treated the rece1pt of cash as a transaction for the benefit of the em-
ployee). But see U.C.C. § 3-304(2) comment 5 (1989) ("The purchaser may pay cash mto the 
hands of the fiduc1ary without notice of any breach of the [fiduc.ary's] obligation."). 
319. U.C.C. § 3-206(d)(1) (I990). 
320. See supra notes 256-66 and accompanymg text. 
321. U.C.C. § 3-206 (I990); see also supra notes 256-66 and accompanymg text. 
322. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanymg text. 
323. Of course it mtght be argued that a transferee of an m-trust mdorsee always has 
notice of a breach of fiductary duty when it pays cash to the mdorsee, smce paymg cash Is 
the equivalent of crediting the mdorsee's personal account and that crediting the personal 
account g1ves notice of a breach of fiduciary duty under revised section 3-307(b)(2). That 
reading of revised section 3-206, however, would mean that the transferee never m fact 
would take free of a clatm by the benefictary of fiductary wrongdomg, m spite of the fact 
that revised section 3-206 seems to grant protection. Such a reading, wh1ch makes revised 
section 3-206 a trap for the unwary transferee, should be rejected. 
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and 3-307, therefore, suggest Inconsistent results when a bank pays 
cash to an m-trust payee of an mstrument. 
The two sectwns also suggest mconsistent results when a bank 
allows an In-trust £ndorsee to deposit the Instrument m his per-
sonal account. If, under revised sectwn 3-206, a transferee bank 
can pay cash to an In-trust Indorsee, It Is difficult to understand 
why It cannot also allow the In-trust mdorsee to deposit the mstru-
ment Into his personal account. In fact, were the contrary rule not 
clearly stated m revised subsection 3-307(b)(2),324 a natural read-
mg of subsectiOn 3-206(d)(l) would be that It applies to credit 
given to a personal account of an m-trust mdorsee as well as to 
cash payments to the Indorsee.326 If an m-trust Indorsee mtends to 
commit fraud when he deposits an In-trust Instrument to his per-
sonal account, he can commit the same fraud by takmg cash at one 
wmdow and then depositmg the cash to his personal account at 
another. 
However, the drafters perhaps concluded that fiducianes do at 
times have need for cash and that a bank should not be automati-
cally at nsk In paymg cash to an m-trust mdorsee. Under that 
ratiOnale, since revised 3-307 does not expressly put the bank on 
notice of possible fiduciary fraud if It pays cash to the fiduc1ary,326 
a bank could pay cash to the m-trust payee without bemg auto-
matically subJect to liability under 3-307, JUst as It can pay cash to 
an m-trust £ndorsee without being automatically subJect to liabil-
Ity under 3-206. In any event, a transferee bank paymg cash to an 
In-trust payee or mdorsee might, on particular facts, be held to 
have acted In bad faith or to have had notice of a claim or defense 
and thus be subject to a claim of the beneficiary that the fiduciary 
misappropnated the funds. If, for example, an admmistrator of an 
estate took a $100,000 check payable to the admimstrator as such 
324. Revised subsection 3-307(b)(2) reads m pertinent part: "In the case of an mstru-
ment payable to the fiduciary as such, the taker has notice of the breach of fiduciary 
duty if the mstrument IS deposited to an account other than an account of the fiductary, 
as such, or an account of the represented person." U.C.C. § 3-307(b)(2)(ii) (1990). Of course, 
once a check 1s mdorsed to "Jones, trustee for Smith," it 1s payable to Jones, who IS Smiths 
"fiduc1ary as such." See ld. § 3-205(a). Therefore, revised subsection 3-307(b)(2) applies to 
the m-trust mdorsement. 
325. /d. § 3-206(d)(l) (permits the transferee to "pay the proceeds of payment or the 
value given for the mstrument to the mdorsee without regard to whether the mdorsee VIO· 
lates a fiduciary duty to the mdorser"). 
326. See ld. § 3-307(b). 
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to the bank In which she maintains a trust account for the estate 
and receives cash over the counter for the check, the bank might 
be liable to the estate if the administrator misappropriates the 
funds. It could be argued that it Is so doubtful that an admmistra-
tor of an estate would have a need for $100,000 cash for estate 
purposes that the bank failed to act In good faith In giving the 
administrator the cash or was on notice of a claim of the estate. 
We have reviewed the basic operatiOn of revised sectiOn 3-307 
which applies to situations In which a bank "knows" that it IS deal-
Ing with a fiduciary We have noted that 3-307 generally follows 
the U.F.A. with one Important exception. That exceptiOn IS that 
under 3-307 a depositary bank IS on notice of a breach of fiduciary 
duty if it allows a fiduciary to deposit to her personal account an 
item payable to the beneficiary or to the fiduciary as such/27 or 
drawn by the beneficiary or the fiduciary as such and· payable to 
the bank.328 Under the U.F.A., the bank could have allowed de-
posit of such Instruments to the account of the fiduciary without 
Incurring liability for any subsequent misappropnatwn by the fi-
duciary unless the bank actually knew of a breach of trust or acted 
In bad faith. We have also noted a possible Inconsistency between 
revised 3-307 and revised 3-206. We now examine the following 
questiOns: (1) Who Is a fiduciary, and (2) What must a bank 
"know" concerning a fiduciary's status before the bank IS subJect 
to liability under revised sectiOn 3-307? 
c. Who Is a Fiducwry Under Rev~sed U C. C. Sectwn 3-
3072-ReVIsed sectiOn 3-307 applies only to transfers from a "fidu-
ciary "329 Revised subsection 3-307(a)(1) defines "fiduciary" as "an 
agent, trustee, partner, corporate officer or director, or other repre-
sentative owing a fiduciary duty with respect to an Instrument."330 
The definitiOn Is broad, but its scope Is unclear. 
"Representative" suggests a person who has been designated 
to act for the pnncipalin some matter. However, a person might 
owe a "fiduciary duty [to another] with respect to an mstru-
ment"331 even though that person had not been gtven the power to 
act as a representative. An employee having no responsibility or 
327. Id. § 3-307(b)(2). 
328. Id. § 3-307(b)(4). 
329. /d. § 3-307(b)(i). 
330. /d. § 3-307(a)(l). 
331. /d. 
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authority with respect to his employer's checks or checkmg ac-
counts who steals a check drawn by the employer payable to a 
bank and then has the check deposited m the employee's personal 
account at the payee bank might be said to owe a fiduciary duty to 
his employer. To the extent that revised sectiOn 3-307 Imposes lia-
bility on a depositary bank that accepts from an employee a check 
payable to the bank for deposit Into the employee's personal 
checkmg account,332 It seems somewhat Incongruous to Impose au-
tomatic liability If the employee IS authorized to handle checks but 
not to do so If the employee has no authority with respect to the 
checks. Therefore, a court might apply 3-307 to all employee cases. 
On the other hand, revised sectiOn 3-307 operates so harshly 
agmnst the bank m the "deposit to the account" cases that It may 
be appropriate to limit Its applicatiOn to real or apparent authority 
situatwns.333 Several courts have held that the U.F.A. applies only 
to persons w1th real or apparent authority, and not to wrongdoers 
without authority 334 Probably the same limitatiOn should be ap-
plied to revised sectiOn 3-307 
d. When Does a Transferee Have Knowledge of Fiducwry 
Status?-Revised sectiOn 3-307 states that It applies only if the 
taker of the Instrument "has knowledge of the fiduciary status of 
the fiduciary "33~> The comment pmnts out that If the taker Is an 
organizatiOn, the relevant knowledge Is that of the " 'individual 
conductmg that transactiOn' " on behalf of the organizatiOn. 336 The 
comment further provides that 
[t]he reqwrement that the taker have knowledge rather than no-
t~ce ~s meant to limzt Sectwn 3-307 to relatwely uncommon cases 
m whLCh the person who deals w~th the fiduc~ary knows all the rel-
evant facts: the fiduciary status and that the proceeds of the 
mstrument are bemg used for the personal debt or benefit of the 
332. /d. § 3-307(b)(2). 
333. As will be noted m the next section of this Article, the fact that the bank IS not 
liable under revised section 3-307 does not mean that it will take free of a beneficiary's 
claim of embezzlement. Particularly, under the new definition of good faith, the bank may 
be held to lack good faith regarding its mvolvement m the transaction, and therefore be 
liable to the beneficiary. See mfra text accompanymg notes 347-62. 
334. See, e.g., Arvada Hardwood Floor Co. v. James, 638 P.2d 828 (Colo. Ct. App. 
I98I); Harlan E. Moore & Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, 13 Ill. App. 2d 232, 141 N.E.2d 97 
(1957). 
335. u.c.c. § 3-307(b)(ii) (1990). 
336. !d. § 3-307 comment 2 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-201(27) (1989)). 
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fiduciary or are bemg pru.d to an account that IS not an account of 
the represented person or of the fiduciary,. as such. Mere notwe of 
these facts IS not enough to put the taker on notice of the breach of 
fiduciary duty. 337 
If, therefore, Mary Smith comes Into the bank with a check drawn 
by Rapid Spinners, Inc., and payable to the bank, but which Mary 
deposits Into her personal account, the bank would not be liable 
under revised section 3-307 unless the teller takmg the check knew 
that Mary was a fiduciary of Rapid Spinners, Inc. In v1ew of the 
relative harshness of the operation of revised sectiOn 3-307 against 
the bank, it would be appropriate to limit the scope of the revised 
sectiOn to cases 1n which the bank teller Involved actually knows 
that the person from whom the Instrument Is taken has fiduciary 
responsibilities with respect to the Instrument,338 not merely .that 
the presenter Is an employee of the drawer of the Instrument. 339 
This IS particularly true Since holding that revised sectiOn 3-307 
does not apply will not automatically relieve the bank from liabil-
ity, l:Jut merely shifts the Inqmry to whether the bank was 
negligent or guilty of bad faith In taking the Instrument.340 
Generally, it should not be too readily assumed that the trans-
feror of an Instrument Is known by the taker to be a fiduciary This 
pmnt IS illustrated by the case of Eldon's Super Fresh Stores v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smz,th, Inc.341 In that case, Drex-
ler, attorney for, and secretary of, the col'porate plaintrff, sent to 
Merrill Lynch, as payment for stocks purchased by Drexler, a 
check drawn by the corporation and payable to Merrill Lynch. 342 
Although the corporation had no account with Merrill Lynch,343 
the court held that Merrill Lynch was a holder m due course since 
It could assume that the check had been given to Drexler, whom 
337. U.C.C. § 3-307 comment 2 (1990) (emphasis added). 
338. See U.C.C. § 1-201(27) (1989); U.C.C. § 3-307(b) & comments 2, 3 & 5 (1990). 
339. But see Bank of S. Md. v. Robertson's Crab House, 39 Md. App. 707, 389 A.2d 
388 (1978) (court cites a number of authorities that state an absolute rule holding banks 
liable for takmg checks payable to the banks themselves and not conststently applymg the 
proceeds according to the Wishes of the drawers). 
340. See U.C.C. §§ 3-405(b) & 3-406(b) (1990). T.he bank may be liable to Rapid Spm-
ners, Inc., on negligence prmciples under revised sections 3-405 and 3-406, or because the 
bank may not be a holder "in due course because it has acted m bad faith. See also mfra 
notes 363-82 & 389-90 and accompanymg text. 
341. 296 Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973). 
342. Eldon's, 296 Minn. at 132, 207 N.W.2d at 284. 
343. Id. 
532 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 42:2:475 
they knew to be an attorney, In payment of a debt to him.344 Under 
revised sectiOn 3-307, 1f Merrill Lynch had known Drexler to be a 
fiduciary, then Merrill Lynch would automatically be liable to 
plamtiff because It had taken the mstrument In a transactiOn 
known to be for the benefit of Drexler. However, the mere fact that 
Merrill Lynch knew that Drexler was an attorney should not be 
treated as givmg knowledge that he was actmg In a fiduciary ca-
pacity with respect to the check. In fact, even If Merrill Lynch 
knew that he was attorney for plaintiff, that would not mean that 
It knew of the "fiduciary status of the fiduciary "345 Lawyers do not 
usually serve as financial fiduciaries for their clients, though m a 
different sense they are certamly fiduciaries. Presumably, If Merrill 
Lynch had known that Drexler was plamtiff's secretary-treasurer, 
It would have known of his fiduciary status,346 and would therefore 
have been liable to the plamtiff If, m fact, Drexler had acted m 
breach of his fiduciary duty 
4. Impact of Objectwe "Good FaLth" Standard Under Re-
msed U C.C. Sectwn 3-103(a)(4) The New DefinLtwn of "Good 
Fmth. "-The revised definition of "good fmth"347 will almost cer-
tainly mcrease the number of cases In which a depositary bank IS 
denied holder m due course status because of a lack of good faith. 
In the context of fiduciary fraud, even though a bank transferee of 
a fiduciary mstrument avoids liability to a beneficiary under re-
vised sectiOn 3-307,348 the bank may be held liable to the 
beneficiary m converswn349 If the fiduciary-transferor has embez-
zled the beneficiary's funds, unless the bank Is held to be a holder 
In due course.350 Under revised Article 3, as under former Art1cle 3, 
344. Id. at 140, 207 N.W.2d at 289. 
345. u.c.c. § 3-307(b)(ii) (1990). 
346. Presumably a secretary-treasurer of a corporation Is always an agent of the corpo-
ratiOn. However, even here, if the check had been signed by someone other than Drexler, 
perhaps Merrill Lynch would not "know" of any fiduciary capacity of Drexler m connectiOn 
with the particular transaction. 
347. Compare U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990) ("'Good faith' means honesty m fact and 
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fau dealing.") wzth U.C.C. § 1-
201(19) (1989) ("'Good faith' means honesty m fact m the conduct or transaction 
concerned."). 
348. u.c.c. § 3-307 (1990). 
349. Id. § 3-420(a) (law of conversiOn applies to mstruments). C{. zd. § 3-206(c) (bank 
failing to apply proceeds consistently with restnctive mdorsement IS liable for conversiOn). 
350. See td. §§ 3-302(a) (definition of "holder m due course" ("HDC")) & 3-306 (nghts 
of HDC). But see Ld. § 3-305(b) (certam legal defects negate HDC status). 
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to be a holder In due course a transferee must take for value, In 
good faith, and without notice of claims, defenses or that the In-
strument IS overdue. 351 Under both the former and revised ArtiCle 
3 provisiOns, notice has obJective elements. 
Under subsectiOn 1-201(25)(c) a person has notice of a fact 
when, from all the facts and circumstances known to him, he has 
reason to know the fact. 352 Therefore, a transferee could have been 
held to have notice of a clarm or defense and, therefore, not be a 
holder In due course even though the transferee did not have ac-
tual knowledge of the defense. Nevertheless, some courts have held 
that failing to Investigate, even when a reasonably prudent person 
would Investigate, does not necessarily establish "notice" and also 
Is not probative of a lack of good faith. 353 The new good faith defi-
nitwn, however, may overrule such cases and give additional force 
to the "without notice" requirement for holder In due course 
status. 
It Is natural to assume that the new requirement that a trans-
feree must observe "reasonable comli\ercial standards of fair 
dealing"354 In order to be acting In good faith requires courts to 
apply a test similar to the "suspiciOus circumstances" or "negli-
gence test" that some courts applied pnor to the adoption of the 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.355 Revised Article 3, how-
ever, IS drafted on the assumptiOn that "good faith" IS not 
synonymous with "ordinary care" which Is the Code term for lack 
of negligence. Both terms are defined In revised Article 3. As noted 
above, good faith IS defined as "honesty In fact and the observance 
of reasonable standards of fair dealing."356 "Ordinary care In the 
case of a person engaged In business" IS defined as the "observance 
of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing In the area In 
351. Compare zd. § 3-302(a)(2) with U.C.C. § 3-302 (1989). 
352. U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c) (1989) ("A person has 'notice' of a fact when from all 
the facts and ctrcumstances known to htm at the time m question he has reason to know it 
extsts. "). 
353. Bankers Trust Co. v. Crawford, 781 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1986); Dallas Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Frtgikmg, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973), cited m 
S. NICKLES, J. MATHESON, & J. DOLAN, MATERIALS FOR UNDERSTANDING CREDIT AND PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS 313 (1987). 
354. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990). 
355. See W. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 244-46 (2d ed. 1961). 
356. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990). 
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which the person Is located, with respect to the business In which 
the person IS engaged. "357 
The comments to rev1sed Articles 3 and 4 do not Indicate m 
any detail the difference between "observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing," the test for good faith, on the 
one hand, and "observance of reasonable commercial standards 
prevailing m the area In whiCh the person IS located," the test of 
ordinary care. Comment 4 to sectiOn 4-406 does offer this distinc-
tion: "The term 'good fmth' IS defined In SectiOn 3-103(a)(4) as 
Including 'observance of reasonable commercial standards of fatr 
dealing.' The connotatiOn of this standard Is fairness and not ab-
sence of negligence."368 However, In the context of holder m due 
course status, "fair dealing" must relate to protectiOn of parties, 
other than the transferor, whose Interests may be adversely af-
fected by the transfer. Therefore, m spite of the comment's 
attempt to disassociate good faith and negligence, "fair dealing" 
would seem to reqmre making mquiries to determine whether the 
transfer IS In derogatiOn of the claim or nght of some prwr party If 
"reasonable commercial standards" would reqmre making such an 
mquiry 359 If, for example, a transferee, Including a bank, fails to 
mvestigate when the circumstances are such that a reasonable 
transferee In the circumstances would have mvestigated, such 
transferee Is likely to be denied holder In due course status be-
cause of Its lack of "fair dealing." For example, if It Is proven that 
banks m a partiCular locality will not accept for deposit to the ac 
count of an employee a check drawn by the employer and payable 
!d. 
357. Id. § 3-103(a)(7). Revised subsection 3-I03(a)(7) prov1des as follows: 
"Ordinary care" m the case of a person engaged m busmess means observance of 
reasonable commerc1al standards, prevailing m the area m wh1ch the person 1s lo-
cated, with respect to the busmess m wh1ch the person IS engaged. In the case of a 
bank that takes an mstrument for processmg for collection or payment by automated 
means, reasonable commercial standards do not reqmre the bank to examme the m-
strument if the failure to examme does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures 
and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general bankmg usage not 
disapproved by th1s Article or Article 4. 
358. U.C.C. § 4-406 comment 4 (I990). 
359. See W BRI'ITON, BILLS AND NoTES 245 (2d ed. 1961). See also N.Y.L. REVISION 
CoMM'N, 2 REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 132-45 (1955). (A "suspicious 
circumstances" test for holder m due course status can be v1ewed as the same as a "lack of 
due care" standard, smce the reasonable transferee would have mvestigated to determme 
the facts before takmg the mstrument.). 
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to the bank, then a bank that does so accept will likely not be a 
holder In due course, even though it may have acted In complete 
honesty, and had no reason to know of a claim or defense. In any 
event, the new "good faith" test will clearly deny holder In due 
course status to some transferees who may have been "honest In 
fact" In taking the Instrument, but, nevertheless, failed to comply 
with procedures that reasonably should have been followed. 
In spite of the close affinity between "good faith" and "ordi-
nary care" under revised Articles 3 and 4, a number of sections In 
both Articles state rules applicable to cases In whiCh a transferee 
has acted In good faith but has failed to exercise ordinary care. 
Among those sections are reVIsed sectwns 3-404, 3-405, and 3-
406.360 The scheme of those sectiOns IS that, In the ·situations de-
scribed therein, 1ndorsements,361 though made without authority, 
are effective In favor of good faith transferees, but are not effective 
as agrunst transferees not In good faith. However, if the good faith 
transferee failed to exercise ordinary care, some or all of the loss 
resulting from the unauthorized Signature may be shifted to the 
transferee.362 The sectwns, therefore, Invite courts to attempt to 
draw distinctiOns ·between acting In good faith and acting with or-
dinary care. 
5. Revr,sed U.C.C. Sectwn 3-405.-A maJor Issue In commer-
cial paper law IS the proper balance between Imposmg loss on the 
employer, and Imposing loss on thud parties, Including banks, that 
deal with dishonest employees who misappropriate negotiable In-
struments payable to, or drawn by, the employer. As previously 
noted, section 3-307 of revised Article 3 departs from the U.F.A. by 
Imposing liability for any subsequent misappropriatiOn of the 
funds on the bank if it accepts for deposit Into the personal ac-
count of an fiduciary, checks payable to the beneficiary, to the 
employee as fiduciary, or to the bank.363 These rules apply to em-
ployees who are fiduciaries. On the other hand, revised sectiOn 3-
360. See mfra note 383 (quoting revised section 3-404); mfra note 368 (quoting revised 
section 3-405); mfra note 389 (quoting revised section 3-406). Section 3-405 IS discussed 
m{ra at text accompanymg notes 364-82. Sections 3-404 and 3-406 are discussed m{ra at 
text accompanymg notes 383-90. 
361. Section 3-406 also applies to unauthonzed alteration. 
362. u.c.c. §§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b) & 3-406(b) (1990). 
363. Compare td. § 3-307 with UNIF. FIDUCIARIES A~§ 9, 7A U.L.A. 417 (1985). See 
also supra notes 55-85 & 267-88 and accompanymg text. 
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405364 goes In the other directiOn, Imposing more responsibility on 
the employer for employee wrongdomg than was the case under 
former Article 3. 36~ 
Under former ArtiCle 3, transferees assumed much of the risk 
of employee fraud. Employees often steal checks from their em-
ployer, forge the Indorsement of the payee, and deposit the checks 
m their own personal accounts. The stolen checks may be either 
checks payable to the employer, or checks drawn by the employer 
and payable to some third party In both cases, under former Arti-
cle 3, the employer can successfully claim that the Indorsements 
are forgeries, thereby shifting the loss to parties who took the 
check from the employee, unless the employer's negligence sub-
stantially contributed to the employee's opportunity to commit the 
forgery 366 The only case In which former Article 3 shifted the loss 
for employee fraud to the employer without proof of negligence on 
the part of the employer was In the "padded payroll" cases m 
which an employee provided the name of a person to whom the 
employer should Issue a check mtending that person to have no 
mterest m the check. 367 Revised sectiOn 3-405 extends "padded 
payroll" type employer liability to cases In which "responsible em-
ployees" steal checks and forge the payee's mdorsement thereon. 
Under revised section 3-405,368 If an employee has responsibility 
364. u.c.c. § 3-405 (1990). 
365. Compare zd. § 3-405 with U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(c) (1989). 
366. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989). If the mdorsement 1s a forgery, no transferee can be a 
holder, and therefore, cannot be a holder m due course who would take free of the clatm of 
the employers that the mstrument has been stolen. U.C.C. §§ 3-201 & 3-202 (1989). 
367. U.C.C. § 3-405(l)(c) & comment 4 (1989). The "padded payroll rule" 1s commer-
Cially JUStifiable as follows: 
[W]here the drawer's agent or employee prepares the check for stgnature or otherwise 
furmshes the s1gmng officer with the name of the payee[,] [t]he prmc1ple followed 1s 
that the loss should fall upon the employer as a nsk of h1s busmess enterpnse rather 
than upon the subsequent holder or drawee. The reasons are that the employer IS 
normally m a better position to prevent such forgenes by reasonable care m the selec 
tion or superv1s10n of h1s employees, or, if he 1s not, 1s at least m a better position to 
cover the loss by fidelity msurance; and that the cost of such msurance 1s properly an 
expense of h1s busmess rather than of the busmess of the holder or drawee. 
!d. § 3-405 comment 4. 
368. Revised section 3-405 prov1des: 
Employer's Responsibility for Fraudulent Indorsement by Employee 
(a) In th1s section: 
(1) "Employee" mcludes an mdependent contractor and employee of an 
mdependent contractor retamed by the employer. 
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with respect to Instruments of the employer, 369 an Indorsement by 
the employee In the name of the payee IS effective In favor of 
transferees, Including depositary banks, that In good faith take the 
Instrument. 370 
(2) "Fraudulent mdorsement" means (i) m the case of an mstrument pay-
able to the employer, a forged mdorsement purporting to be that of the 
employer, or (ii) m the case of an mstrument with respect to wh1ch the em-
ployer IS the Issuer, a forged mdorsement purporting to be that of the person 
Identified as payee. 
(3) "Responsibility" with respect to mstruments means authority (i) to 
s1gn or mdorse mstruments on behalf of the employer, (ii) to process mstru-
ments received by the employer for bookkeepmg purposes, for deposit to an 
account, or for other disposition, (iii) to prepare or process mstruments for 
Issue m the name of the employer, (iv) to supply mformation determmmg the 
names or addresses of payees of mstruments to be Issued m the name of the 
employer, (v) to control the disposition of mstruments to be Issued m the name 
of the employer, or (vi) to act otherwise with respect to mstruments m a re-
sponsible capacity. "Responsibility" does not mclude authority that merely 
allows an employee to have access to mstruments or blank or mcomplete m-
strument forms that are bemg stored or transported or are part of mcommg or 
outgomg mail, or similar access. 
(b) For the purpose of determmmg the rights and liabilities of a person who, m 
good faith, pays an mstrument or takes it for value or for collection, if an employer 
entrusted an employee with responsibility with respect to the mstrument and the 
employee or a person acting m concert with the employee makes a fraudulent In-
dorsement of the mstrument, the mdorsement IS effective as the mdorsement of the 
person to whom the mstrument IS payable if it IS made m the name of that person. If 
the person paymg the mstrument or takmg it for value or for collection fails to exer-
cise ordinary care m paymg or takmg the mstrument and that failure substantially 
contributes to loss resulting from the fraud, the person bearmg the loss may recover 
from the person failing to exercise ordinary care to the extent the failure to exercise 
ordinary care contributed to the loss. 
(c) Under subsection (b), an mdorsement IS made m the name of the person to 
whom the mstrument IS payable if (i) it IS made m a name substantially similar to the 
name of that person or (ii) the mstrument, whether or not mdorsed, 1s deposited m a 
depositary bank to an account m a name substantially similar to the name of that 
person. 
/d.§ 3-405. 
369. /d. § 3-405(a)(3) (definmg "responsibility"). 
370. See td. § 3-405(b). Revised subsection 3-405(b) provides as follows: 
[T]he mdorsement IS effective as the mdorsement of the person to whom the 
mstrument 1s payable if it zs made m the name of that person. [However i)f the 
person paymg the [forged] mstrument or takmg it for value or for collection fails to 
.exerczse ordinary care m payzng or takmg the [forged] mstrument and that failure 
substantially contributes to loss resulting from the fraud, the person bearmg the loss 
may recover from the person failing to exercise ordinary care 
Id. § 3-405(b) (emphasis added). But see td. §§ 3-406(a) (employer may be "precluded from 
asserting the alteration or the forgery where the employer has fail[ed] to exercise ordi-
nary care") & 3-406(b) (comparative negligence allocation scheme applicable to the extent 
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Under revised subsectiOn 3-405(b), If the transferee takes the 
Instrument In good faith, but fails to exercise ordinary care In pay-
mg or taking the Instrument and such failure substantially 
contributes to loss from fiduciary fraud, then the transferee IS lia-
ble to the employer to the extent such failure to exercise ordinary 
care contributed to the loss. As noted earlier m the discussiOn of 
good faith under revised Article 3,371 the distmctwn between the 
failure to observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
mg" (the good faith standard) and the failure to exercise ordinary 
care Is difficult, If not Impossible, to draw; but It IS clear that re-
vised sectiOn 3-405 Invites such a distmction. The sectiOn, 
therefore, permits a court to Impose the entire loss on the em-
ployer by finding that the transferee acted m good faith, Impose 
the ent1re loss on the transferee by finding that the transferee did 
not act In good faith, or split the loss on what Is, In effect, a com-
parative fault basis, by finding that the transferee did act In good 
faith, but nevertheless, failed to exercise ordinary care. 372 
Assume, then, a case to which revised sectiOn 3-405 applies. 
Employee, who has authonty to process mcoming checks for book-
keeping purposes, steals a check, forges her employer's 
mdorsement, and deposits the check In her personal account, after 
adding her Indorsement below the forged Indorsement of her em-
ployer. Assume that Employee, IS not a fiduciary, so that revised 
sectwn 3-307373 does not apply 374 If the bank has acted m good 
fmth, the Indorsement IS treated as genmne, and the bank can take 
free of the employer's claim to the mstrument.375 If, however, Em-
such failure "contributed to the loss where both employer and bank fail[ed] to exercise ordi-
nary care"). 
371. See supra notes 347-62 and accompanymg text. 
372. The statutory language IS that the negligent transferee bears the loss "to the ex-
tent the failure to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss." U.C.C. § 3-405 (1990). 
Draft comment 4 to revised section 3-405 gives a hypothetical case m which a court could 
find that the transferee depositary bank was m good faith but negligent; the comment then 
states that m such a case: "The trier of fact could allow recovery by Employer from Deposi-
tary Bank for all or part of the loss suffered by Employer." ld. § 3-405 comment 4. 
373. ld. § 3-307. 
374. See supra notes 264 & 269-319 and accompanymg text. 
375. Under former Article 3, the employer would be liable on the facts stated only if 
the employer had been negligent m its selection of the employee, or m the establishment or 
mamtenance of mternal security and auditing procedures. See B. CLARK, THE LAw OF BANK 
DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS, AND CREDIT CARDS § 8.04[7)[a] (3d ed. I990). 
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ployee Is a fiduciary, revised section 3-307376 applies and the bank 
will not take free of the employer's rights In the Instrument. The 
result seems peculiar; the greater the authority the employer has 
vested In the employee, the more likely the risk of loss will be 
shifted to a bank that takes the Instrument from the employee. 
Of course, under revised section 3-405, the bank will be able to 
treat the Indorsement as genuine only if it has acted In good 
faith. 377 Further, as Indicated In the previous discussiOn of "good 
faith,"378 the fact that a bank permits an employee to deposit a 
check payable to the employer Into her personal account may be 
sufficient, In any event, to prevent the bank from taking In "good 
faith." Therefore, revised section 3-405 may protect a bank only In 
the case where the bank does not know that the person depositing 
the check IS a "responsible employee" of the payee. 379 If so, there 
may be no overlap between revised sections 3-405 and 3-307 
However, good faith, even when it Includes a requirement of 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, 
probably would not require a depositary bank to make Inquiries of 
an employer In every Imaginable situation In whrch an employee 
presents for deposit, to her personal account, a check Indorsed In 
blank by the employer. Therefore, it IS likely that there IS, In fact, 
overlap and Inconsistency between revised sections 3-307 and 3-
405. Revised sectiOn 3-405 Imposes greater risk on the employer for 
employee fraud, Including fraud by employee fiduciaries, 380 than 
was the case under priOr law. It does that by making the em-
ployee's Indorsement effective In cases In which it would not have 
been effective under former Article 3. 381 On the other hand, revised 
section 3-307 Imposes greater risk on persons who deal with fiduci-
aries than IS presently the case In those states that have adopted 
the U.F.A., as well as In those non-U.F.A. states that do not Im-
pose automatic liability on a bank :that permits a known fiduciary 
376. u.c.c. § 3-307 (1990). 
377. Id. § 3-405(b) & comment 2. 
378. See supra notes 347-62 and accompanymg text. 
379. /d. 
380. See supra note 366. 
381. See U.C.C. § 3-405(b) & comment 1 (1990). "Under former Section 3-406, the 
employer took the loss only if negligence of the employer could be proved. Under revised 
Article 3, Section 3-406 need not be used with respect to forgenes of the employer's mdorse-
ment. Section 3-405 imposes the loss on the employer without proof of negligence." Id. § 3-
405 comment 1. 
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to deposit fiduciary checks to the personal account of the 
fiduciary 382 
6. Remsed U C. C. Sectwns 3-404 and 3-406.-Sectwns 3-404 
and 3-406 of revised Article 3 are also relevant to consideratiOn of 
the new rules applicable to bank liability for fiduciary fraud. Re-
VIsed sectwn 3-404383 IS the Imposter-padded payroll sectwn which 
replaces 3-405 In former ArtiCle 3. Among the cases covered by the 
revised sectwn are cases m which an employee havmg power to 
sign checks makes checks payable to a payee mtending the payee 
to have no mterest In the mstrument or m which an employee, In-
tending the payee to have no mterest In the mstrument, supplies 
the name of the payee to the person havmg authonty to sign 
checks. In both cases, an Indorsement by any person m the name 
of the payee IS effective m favor of a good faith transferee or 
payor.384 However, If the transferee acts In good faith but fails to 
382. See U.C.C. § 3-307 {1990); see also supra notes 78-79, 280-84 & 296-97 and ac 
companymg text. 
383. Revtsed section 3-404 provtdes: 
Impostors; Fictitious Payees. 
(a) If an Impostor, by use of the mails or otherwtse, mduces the 1ssuer of an 
mstrument to 1ssue the mstrument to the Impostor, or to a person acting m concert 
with the Impostor, by Impersonating the payee of the mstrument or a person author-
Ized to act for the payee, an mdorsement of the mstrument by any person m the 
name of the payee 1s effective as the mdorsement of the payee m favor of a person 
who, m good faith, pays the mstrument or takes it for value or for collection. 
(b) If (i) a person whose mtent determmes to whom an mstrument IS payable 
(Section 3-llO(a) or (b)) does not mtend the person tdentified as payee to have any 
mterest m the mstrument, or (ii) the person tdentified as payee of an mstrument IS a 
fictitious person, the followmg rules apply until the mstrument IS negotiated by spe-
c~al mdorsement: 
(1) Any person m possess1on of the mstrument IS its holder. 
{2) An mdorsement by any person m the name of the payee stated m the 
mstrument IS effective as the mdorsement of the payee m favor of a person 
who, m good faith, pays the mstrument or takes it for value or for collection. 
(c) Under subsection (a) or (b), an mdorsement IS made m the name of a payee if 
(i) it IS made m a name substantially s1milar to that of the payee or (ii) the mstru-
ment, whether or not mdorsed, IS deposited m a depositary bank to an account m a 
name substantially stmilar to that of the payee. 
(d) With respect to an mstrument to whtch subsection (a) or (b) applies, if a 
person paymg the mstrument or takmg it for value or for collection fails to exerctse 
ordinary care m paymg or takmg the mstrument and that failure substantially con-
tributes to loss resulting from payment of the mstrument, the person bearmg the loss 
may recover from the person failing to exercrse ordinary care to the extent the failure 
to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss. 
u.c.c. § 3-404 (1990). 
384. /d. § 3-404(b)(2). 
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exercise ordinary care, as under revised 3-405, the court can appor-
tiOn the loss between the drawer and the transferee or payor on 
what are, In effect, comparative fault principles. 385 In allowmg 
courts to shift some or all of the loss to a transferee or payor who 
acts In good faith but Is negligent, revised 3-404 Imposes greater 
risk on depositary or paying banks than was the case In most states 
under former section 3-405. Former sectiOn 3-405 did not state the 
circumstances under which the Indorsement would not be effective 
In favor of a transferee or payor386 but most courts held that only 
bad faith of the transferee or payee deprived it of the right to rely 
on the Indorsement. 387 Even though shifting a part of the loss to a 
transferee or payor that acts In good faith but fails to exercise or-
dinary care In the 3-404 case Increases the risk of transferees or 
payors, it IS consistent with the same result In the similar 3-405 
cases already discussed. 388 
SectiOn 3-406 In revised Article 3 continues the rule of 3-406 
In former Article 3 that a person whose negligence substantially 
contributes to the makmg of an unauthorized signature Is pre-
cluded from asserting the forgery agamst a person who In good 
I d. 
385. I d. § 3-404(d). Rev1sed subsection 3-404(d) reads m pertinent part' as follows: 
[l]f a person paymg the mstrument or takmg it for value or for collection fails to 
exerc1se ordinary care m paymg or takmg the mstrument and that failure substan-
tially contributes to loss resulting from payment of the mstrument, the person 
bearmg the loss may recover from the person failing to exerc1se ordinary care to the 
extent the failure to exerc1se ordinary care contributed to the loss. 
The second paragraph of comment 3 to 3-404 states that if a transferee or drawer has 
been negligent, the drawee has a cause of action agamst the transferee or drawee to recover 
a portion of the loss with the amount of loss to be allocated to each part to be left to the 
finder of fact. Id. § 3-404 comment 3. 
386. U.C.C. § 3-405 (1989). The section merely prov1ded that m the situations stated 
an mdorsement by any person was effective. It sa1d nothmg about the persons m whose 
favor the mdorsement was effective. 
387. See, e.g., Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 
184 Ga. App. 326, 361 S.E.2d 531 (1987) (holding that negligence on the part of a transferee 
did not prevent mdorsements good under former section 3-405 from bemg effective m favor 
of the transferee). The Northbrook court thought that denymg transferees the protection of 
former section 3-405 only if they acted m bad faith effectuated the purpose of 3-405 to shift 
the r1sk of faithless employees from the transferees or drawees who deal with the employee 
to the employer who selected and had means of control over the employee. The court cited 
cases from seven other JUrisdictions reachmg the same result. The Califorma Court of Ap-
peals did hold m a 1983 case that negligence of a depositary bank m1ght preclude it from 
relymg on the validity of mdorsements under 3-405. E.F Hutton Co., Inc. v. City Nat'l 
Bank, 149 Cal. App. 3d 60, 190 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1983). 
388. See supra notes 363-81 and accompanymg text. 
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faith takes or pays the Instrument. 389 That revised sectiOn, also, 
now adopts a comparative negligence rule under whiCh If a trans-
feree or drawee Is m good fa1th but negligent, "the loss IS allocated 
between the person precluded [from asserting the forgery] and the 
person asserting the preclusiOn according to the extent to which 
the failure of each to exercise ordinary care contributed to the 
loss."390 
D Summary of Remsed Art~cle 3 Rules as to Bank Lwbility 
for Fiducwry Fraud 
Revised sectiOns 3-404 and 3-405 give the courts substantial 
flexibility m determinmg whether on the facts of a particular case 
the loss should fall on an employer or other beneficiary or on the 
transferee from the beneficiary's fiduciary Also, revised sectiOn 3-
406 adopts the same flexibility In cases mvolvmg negligence of a 
drawer or other party that contributes to the makmg of an unau-
thonzed signature or an alteratwn. On the other hand, revised 3-
307 Imposes automatic liability on a bank whiCh accepts a fiduciary 
Instrument for deposit to the personal account of a fiduciary It Is 
389. Revised section 3-406 provides: 
Negligence Contributing to Forged Signature or Alteration of Instrument. 
{a) A person whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributed to 
an alteration of an mstrument or to the makmg of a forged signature on an mstru-
ment IS precluded from asserting the alteration or the forgery agamst a person who, 
m good faith, pays the mstrument or takes it for value or for collection. 
{b) Under subsection {a) , if the person asserting the preclusiOn fails to exercise 
ordinary care m paymg or takmg the mstrument and that failure substantially con-
tributes to loss, the loss 1s allocated between the person precluded and the person 
asserting the preclusiOn according to the extent to which the failure of each to exer-
Cise ordinary care contributed to the loss. 
(c) Under subsection (a), the burden of provmg failure to exercise ordinary care 
1s on the person asserting the preclusiOn. Under subsection (b), the burden of provmg 
failure to exercise ordinary care IS on the person precluded. 
u.c.c. § 3-406 (1990). 
390. Id. § 3-406{b). Former section 3-406 operated m favor of drawees only if they 
pa1d m good faith and m accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of their 
busmess. Therefore, if a drawee bank was held to have failed to act m accordance with 
reasonable commercial standards, it took the entire loss. See, e.g., Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. 
Cnsp, 608 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1980), where, even though the drawer may have been negligent, 
the drawee bank took the loss where it was found that it had failed to follow reasonable 
commercial standards m paymg the check. In that case, rev1sed 3-406 JS more favorable for 
the drawee bank smce a bank's negligence will not be an absolute bar to recovery. 
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Instructive to consider three recent cases and how they might be 
decided under reVIsed Article 3. 
E.F Hutton & Co. v. City Natwnal Bank391 Involved an em-
ployee who supplied the employer with the names of payees 
Intending them to have no Interest. He then stole the checks, 
forged the payees' Indorsements, and deposited them Into his per-
sonal account at the defendant bank. Over the course of a year, he 
deposited eighteen checks, the largest In the amount of $81,598, 
and the smallest for $10,000. The court held that the employer had 
stated a cause of action In negligence against the bank.392 Simi-
larly, In Transamenca Insurance Co. v. Um,ted States Natwnal 
Bank of Oregon, 393 the court held that the Issue was whether the 
bank was negligent In acceptmg checks payable to the bank for 
deposit Into the account of an employee of the drawer.394 In Doug-
las v. Wones,3915 the court held that a bank, as payee of a check, 
was not a holder In due course when the bank took the check from 
a person other than the drawer since the bank did· not Inquire of 
the drawer regarding the presenter's authorization to receive pro-
ceeds from the check. 396 
391. 149 Cal. App. 3d 60, 196 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1983). 
392. E.F Hutton, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 620 ("[T]he collecting bank 
may bear liability for loss if it has culpably contributed to the forgery's· success. When 
the collecting bank IS confronted with obviously susp1c1ous Circumstances and could have 
reasonably foreseen the plamtiff's loss, the defendant became subJect to general negli-
gence liability."). But see Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l 
Bank, 184 Ga. App. 326, 361 S.E.2d 531 (1987) (declimng to follow E.F Hutton); M & K 
Corp. v. Farmers State Bank, 496 N.E.2d 111 (Ind. App. Ct. 1986) (disagreemg with the E.F 
Hutton dec1s1on). 
393. 276 Or. 945, 558 P .2d 328 (1976). 
394. Transamenca Ins., 276 Or. at 951, 558 P.2d at 333 ("The 1ssue IS not whether the 
bank should have accepted the signatures on the checks as valid, but whether, assummg the 
validity of the Signatures, the bank was Justified m transferrmg funds represented by the 
checks to the accounts of thud parties who were not the named payees."). 
395. 120 Ill. App. 3d 36, 458 N.E.2d 514 (1983). 
396. Douglass, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 46, 458 N.E.2d at 522. The court reasoned as follows: 
[U]nder these [susp1c1ous] Circumstances the bank IS reqmred to hold the proceeds of 
the mstrument subJect to the order of the drawer, and not the presenter, and it gen-
erally cannot be a holder m due course as agamst the drawer if it has permitted the 
presenter to withdraw or otherwise use the proceeds of the check without takmg pre-
cautions to determme the authority of the person to rece1ve them. 
ld. (citing People ex rel. Nelson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 271 Ill. App. 41, cert. demed, 
353 Ill. 479, 187 N.E. 522 (1933)). 
The Douglass court also quoted the 1926 dec1s1on of Milano v. Shendan Trust & Sav. 
Bank, 242 Ill. App. 362, cert. demed, 242 Ill. App. XIV (1926): 
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In all three of the above cases, there are several possible re-
sults under revised Article 3. In E.F Hutton, because the check 
was not payable to E.F Hutton, nor to the employee as fiduciary, 
nor to the bank, revised 3-307 would not apply even if the em-
ployee was a fiduciary and the bank knew of that fact. 397 However, 
3-307 would be applicable to both the Transamenca and Douglass 
cases, since the checks In those cases were payable to the bank. 
Therefore, If the depositors In Transamenca and Douglass were 
fiduciaries and the banks knew that they were, the banks would be 
automatically liable for any misappropnatwn of the funds by the 
fiducianes.398 If, however, the depositors In Transamenca and 
Douglass were not fiduc1anes, or the banks did not know that they 
were, then none of the three cases would be subJect to 3-307, but 
all three might be subJect to revised sectiOns 3-404, 3-405, or 3-
406.399 
Revised sectiOn 3-404 would apply If the depositors provided 
the drawers with the names of the payees Intending them to have 
no mterest. If 3-404 did not apply, sectiOn 3-405 would apply if the 
depositors were employees or mdependent contractors who had re-
sponsibility wtth respect to the Instruments. Under either 3-404 or 
3-405 there are three possible results: loss on the employer if the 
depositary bank acted In good faith and exercised ordinary care, 
"There 1s a marked difference between the obligations of a bankmg mstitution 
rece1vmg funds and an mdivtdual. The latter does not ordinarily recetve checks paya-
ble to hts order from persons not mdebted to htm; he 1s not the custodian of funds m 
whtch he has no mterest; nor 1s he a depositary for such members of the public as 
wtsh to avail themselves of h1s serv1ces. On the other hand, a bank IS all of these. The 
public 1s mvited to use its convemences as places of deposit; tt holds Ltself out as 
trustworthy for such purposes; when it 1s named as the payee m a check by a party 
not mdebted to it, it will be presumed that tt accepts the same subject to the direc· 
twns of the drawer and not to the directwns of a stranger to the paper who happens 
to present it ." 
Douglass, I20 Ill. App. 3d at 46, 458 N.E.2d at 522 (emphasis added) (quoting Milano, 242 
Ill. App. at 369). 
397. Rev1sed section 3-307 applies only to mstruments payable to the beneficiary or to 
the fiductary as such and mstruments drawn by the benefic1ary or the fiductary as such and 
payable to the taker of the mstrument, mcluding a depositary bank. See U.C.C. § 3-307 
(1990). 
398. Under 3-307, if the bank, knowmg that the depositor IS a fiduciary, allows deposit 
of an mstrument drawn by the beneficiary or the fiductary as such to be deposited to the 
personal account of the fiductary, the bank 1s on notice of the clatm of the beneficiary. I d. § 
3-307(b)(l) & (4). 
399. Under revtsed sections 3-404, 3-405 and 3-406, the finder of fact can flexibly ap-
portion the loss. See supra notes 363-82 and accompanymg text. 
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loss on the bank if it failed to act In good faith (including the ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing), or 
loss apportioned between the drawer and the bank if the bank ac-
ted In good faith but failed to exercise ordinary care. 
If sections 3-307, 3-404, and 3-405 did not apply, section 3-406 
might apply if the drawers of the checks were found to be negli-
gent. In that case, the same three outcomes as under 3-404 and 3-
405 are possible. Interestingly, In the Transamenca case, the 
drawer of the checks In questiOn, a real estate escrow company, 
regularly drew checks payable to the depositary bank for credit to 
the account of sellers of real estate. On those facts, the court sug-
gested that the finder of fact might find the bank not negligent, at 
least as to checks which were submitted to the bank In the same 
manner as checks submitted to the bank In transactions authorized 
by the drawer:'00 ReVIsed section 3-307, however, does not seem to 
permit that flexibility except through a holding that the bank did 
not know of the fiduciary status of the depositor. 401 
Only In cases covered by sectiOn 3-307 does revised ArtiCle 3 
clearly mandate a result. In the cases covered by 3-307, if the bank 
knows of the fiduciary status of its transferor, bank takes the risk 
that the transactions described In that sectiOn are part of a misap-
propriation or planned misappropriatiOn of the beneficiary's funds. 
In the similar cases covered by reVIsed sections 3-404 and 3-405, 
the finder of fact can place some or all of the loss on the employer 
of a wrongdmng employee. Similarly, under 3-406, In the case of 
negligence which contributes to the makmg of an unauthorized sig-
nature or alteration, the finder of fact has power to allocate risk 
between the party whose negligence contributed to the wrongdoing 
and subsequent transferees or drawees on comparative fault pnnci-
ples. In the context of employee fraud, it seems somewhat peculiar 
that only In cases In which the employer has, to the bank's knowl-
edge, vested the employee with fiduciary powers does revised 3-307 
Infiexibily rmpose the risk of employee wrongdoing on the deposi-
tary bank. However, it must be remembered that 3-307 applies 
only to cases In which an Instrument payable to (a) the beneficiary, 
400. 276 Ore. 945, 558 P.2d 328 (1976). 
401. Under revised subsection 3-307(b)(4) the bank IS on notice of a breach of fiduct-
ary duty if it, knowmg of the fiductary status, accepts for deposit to the personal account of 
the fiductary a check drawn by the benefictary and payable to the bank. See U.C.C. § 3-
307(b)(4) (1990). 
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(b) the fiduciary as such, or (c) the bank, IS transferred to the bank 
by the fiduciary In a transactiOn known by the bank to be for (1) 
the benefit of the fiduciary or (2) for deposit mto the personal ac-
count of the fiduciary It must also be remembered that, With the 
exception of deposits to the personal account of the fiduciary, re-
vised sectiOn 3-307 merely continues the rules of the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act, now m effect In many states. 402 
IV CONCLUSION 
This Article has discussed those provisions of revised Article 3 
that are directly relevant to bank liability to a beneficiary whose 
fiduciary, dealing with the bank, misappropnates funds belongmg 
to the beneficiary We have also reviewed the law under the previ-
ous vers10n of Article 3 as well as the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 
whiCh has been adopted by approximately half the states. Six spe-
cific sect10ns of revised ArtiCle 3, sect10ns 3-110, 3-206, 3-307, 3-
404, 3-405, and 3-406 plus the new definition of "good faith" have 
been considered. 
Revised sectiOn 3-110, which deals with whether particular 
language following the name of a payee puts transferees on notice 
of the payee's fiduciary status, differs Inconsequentially from for-
mer 3-117 As noted earlier, revised sect10ns 3-206 and 3-307, with 
one except10n, follow the provisions of the Uniform Fiducianes Act 
and permit a bank to accept an Instrument from a fiduciary with-
out being liable to the beneficiary for any wrongdomg by the 
fiduciary, unless the bank knows that the transactiOn Is for the 
personal benefit of the fiduciary or the bank otherwise acts In bad 
faith. The one exceptiOn IS under revised sectiOn 3-307; a bank that 
accepts a fiduciary check for deposit mto the personal account of 
the fiduciary, without Inquiry of the beneficiary as to the right of 
the fiduciary to do so, IS liable If the fiduciary then misappropri-
ates the funds. 403 
At least In the case where the fiduciary Is an employee of the 
beneficiary, the Imposition of liability on the bank that accepts the 
fiduciary Instrument for deposit to the fiduciary's personal account 
may be mconsistent with the policy behind revtsed section 3-405. 
402. See supra notes 53-85 and accompanymg text (discusswn of the U.F.A.). 
403. See U.C.C. § 3-307 (1990). 
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Revised sectiOn 3-405 now makes Indorsement by an employee (in-
cluding an Independent contractor) effective if the employer 
entrusted the employee with responsibility with respect to checks 
or other Instruments. Therefore, In the situatiOns to whiCh revised 
section 3-405 applies, a bank will more likely than under present 
Article 3 be a holder In due course and take title to the Instrument 
free of any claims by the employer as a result of the employee's 
wrongful conduct. However, also pursuant to revised section 3-405, 
if the transferee takes from a "responsible employee," IS a holder 
In due course, but Is nevertheless negligent, the loss may be appor-
tiOned by the trier of fact between the employer and the 
transferee. 
It might well have been preferable to apply flexible guidelines 
with respect to specific factual situations, like those outlined In the 
comments to reVIsed section 3-405, to all transactiOns by fiducia-
ries. Under revised section 3-307 the provisions that protect the 
person (including a bank) who takes from a fiduciary, provided the 
taker has acted In good faith, are, In fact, fairly flexible, except 
with respect to deposits by a fiduciary to her personal account. 
This Is particularly true since good faith now requires the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. However, 
one aspect of the revised section 3-405 rules IS not available under 
rev.Ised section 3-307· the ability to apportion the loss between the 
beneficiary and -the transferee. 
The rule of revised sectiOn 3-307 that a bank Is liable if it ac-
cepts a fiduciary-Indorsed Instrument for deposit Into the personal 
account of the fiduciary without first verifYing the fiduciary's au-
thority with the beneficiary Is Inconsistent with 3-405 and IS of 
questionable policy This rigid rule, which Imposes liability without 
regard to the other circumstances surrounding the transaction, will 
no doubt at times Impose liability upon the depositary bank even 
though the bank acted completely In good faith and without the 
slightest suspiCIOn that a misappropriatiOn of fiduciary funds was 
occurring. Of course, whether such a rule IS JUStified depends sub-
stantially upon how much additional cost will be Imposed upon 
fiduciary transactions with banks. There are two elements of such 
cost: (1) the costs of training bank personnel against accepting any 
fiduciary checks for deposit Into personal fiduciary accounts, and 
of the extra time and attention that will be required by bank per-
sonnel to carry out such InstructiOns; and (2) the costs and 
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Inconvenience to beneficiaries If banks are forced to always reqmre 
that a separate trust account be opened for any fiduciary who IS 
depositing a fiduciary mstrument. 
Fiduciaries operate In an almost mfinite vanety of situatiOns. 
Following are some common examples: (1) a volunteer, unpaid 
treasurer of a local charity or service organizatiOn; (2) an admmis-
trator or executor of an estate, wh1ch may range from small to 
qmte large; (3) an adult child with authonty to manage an elderly 
or Incapacitated parent's financial affairs; ( 4) a trustee of a trust 
With either large or small assets and cash flow; (5) a lawyer who 
regularly recmves checks payable to her as attorney for a client; (6) 
a corporate president and sole shareholder who treats his personal 
assets and the corporatiOn's assets as mterchangeable; (7) a presi-
dent of a corporatiOn with a number of stockholders; and (8) an 
employee of a business who has general or limited authority to 
wnte and Indorse checks. 
In none of these situatiOns IS It clear that the deposit mto a 
fiduciary's personal account IS the first step m an embezzlement 
scheme. The mere fact of deposit Into the fiduciary's personal ac-
count does not establish that the transactiOn IS for the personal 
benefit of the fiduciary There may well be reasons for the deposit 
that are entirely consistent w1th the fiduciary's duty; the benefi-
Ciary may not have an account with the bank or, for other reasons, 
It may be desirable to make the deposit to the fiduciary's personal 
account. Furthermore, deposit transactions are routmely mass-
processed transactiOns. Therefore, the onerous duty of mqmry as 
to each and every fiduciary transactiOn may 1mpose too great a 
burden upon banks and their personnel. 
Therefore, 1mposmg as a general rule such a burden upon the 
check collectiOn system may be an mappropnate ImpositiOn of lia-
bility on banks takmg deposits from fiduciaries. It IS by no means 
clear that a bank should be automatically held liable for any em-
bezzlement by a fiduciary after deposit by the fiduciary of a 
fiduciary Item Into the fiduciary's personal account. 
There are, however, special consideratiOns In the case of em-
ployee fraud. It can be argued that, m the employee context, It IS 
so unusual for a check payable or mdorsed to the employer to be 
deposited Into the personal account of an employee-fiduciary, that 
In all such cases the depositary should assume the nsk that the 
employee makmg the deposit Is breaching her fiduciary duty On 
1991] Fiduciary Fraud 549 
the other hand, there IS the offsetting factor that, In the employee 
case, the employer likely has an equal or better opportunity to pre-
vent the loss by care In the selectiOn of "responsible employees," 
and In the creatiOn of operating procedures for the preventiOn and 
discovery of employee fraud. In the case of employee-forged Indor-
sements, revised section 3-405 recognizes that aspect of the risk of 
loss calculus, and Implicitly makes Indorsements of such employees 
effective, although such Indorsements were otherwise treated as 
forgerres under former Article 3. The new rules of revised sectiOn 
3-405 appropriately recognize that employers should assume 
greater responsibility for employee forgery, and also through the 
applicatiOn of holder In due course and negligence rules, permit a 
flexible allocatiOn of loss based upon the circumstances surround-
Ing the Individual case. It might have been better had revised 
Article 3 applied flexible principles like those of revised section 3-
405 to the fiduciary cases dealt with by revised sectiOn 3-307 
On the other hand, it IS understandable that the draftmg com-
mittee would not choose to totally abandon a statutory scheme 
that has been adopted by approximately half the states. Further, it 
may be that the relative certainty that exists under revised sectiOn 
3-307 Is preferable to the greater flexibility, and its Inherent uncer-
tainty, under revised sectiOn 3-405. Only experience under revised 
Article 3 can answer that question. In the meantime, it Is appropri-
ate to suggest that courts read revised section 3-307 narrowly so 
that, In as many cases as possible, the usual holder In due course 
rules and, In appropriate cases, the negligence rules of revised Arti-
cle 3 will apply 
